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P R E F A C E
This essay was written on the occasion of my farewell on leaving Radboud University 
Nijmegen in the Netherlands. Part of the text was presented in my farewell lecture on 
September 4 , 2009 entitled: Methodologie voor praktijkgericht onderzoek; een noodzakelijke 
ketterij. (A methodology for practice-oriented research; a necessary heresy). This lec­
ture was the final piece of a symposium with the title: Praktijkgericht wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek: ketterij of noodzaak? (Practice-oriented scientific research: heresy or neces­
sity?). When Joan van Aken from the University of Eindhoven in the Netherlands -  one 
of the keynote speakers -  coined the term heresy for the title of this symposium, I 
immediately agreed. This despite the fact that it may look presumptuous and can be 
dangerous; the heresy of today may easily become the blind doctrine of tomorrow. But 
its implicit reference to a doctrine may help to alert scientists to the neglect of practice- 
oriented research as an independent scientific discipline.
In this farewell essay I would like to thank a few people and departments who 
have played an important role in my academic life. First of all, I would like to express my 
gratitude to the Radboud University of Nijmegen for offering me a place to work for 
almost forty years. For me it was a safe working environment, imbued with academic 
values. I would also like to mention Wageningen University and Research Centre, where 
I had a second chair in the period 20 0 1-2005 , and where I learned what no-nonsense 
science means.
I’m grateful to Jac Vennix. I could not have had a better colleague. He and my col­
league, the dedicated Hubert Korzilius assisted me in organizing the symposium with 
their ideas, networks, emotional and financial support. And together with my excellent 
colleague Inge Bleijenbergh, they also edited an intriguing book on the occasion of my 
departure entitled: Voervoor methodologen (Food for methodologists). Several contribu­
tions to this volume relate to issues that I once planned to scrutinize in the future. The 
authors have now done it for me. It’s fascinating, and illuminating to see how they 
perceive and elaborate on these intriguing subject matters.
I would also like to thank the other colleagues in the Methodology Section, with 
whom I worked for the last eight years. They not only put a great deal of effort into the 
book I just mentioned, despite their intensive education programme. They also pro­
vided me with a warm working environment, where collegiality was natural. As to the 
book, it stands to reason that I should include in my thanks all those from outside the 
Methodology Section and Radboud University who contributed to it.
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Finally I would like to express my gratitude to the inimitable Netherlands Institute for 
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences ( n i a s )  at Wassenaar in the 
Netherlands. This internationally respected institute twice offered me a fellowship. Here 
I became acquainted with renowned scientists, several of whom became friends. I men­
tion Theo Kuipers, Walter Müller, Gerhard Hirschfeld, Laszlo Zsolnai, Peter Swanborn, 
Mineke Schipper, Giora Hon, Martijn Berger and Douglas Hershey. They, together with 
the Institute with its excellent intellectual climate, warm social environment and un­
surpassable support of the staff, greatly contributed not only to my productivity, but 
especially to my education as a scientist.
Malden, November 2009
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'But it [methodology; pv] is simply a matter of persevering! Without hard work there is 
nothing, except possibly methodological junk food, satisfying for the moment but leading to 
malnutrition in the end...' (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2 0 0 0 )
I N T R O D U C T IO N
For a long time research in the social, policy and management sciences was theory- 
oriented, characterized by the production of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, without a 
specific external goal. The search for knowledge without any profit was regarded as the 
best guarantee for finding valuable insights, which sooner or later would appear useful 
to society and its members. For traditional scientists practice-oriented research is a sin. 
However, nowadays this type of research holds increasing interest for universities. First 
of all, the importance of the social and political relevance of scientific research is 
growing in general. Results should more and more meet the criterion of utility. There is 
also a tendency for universities to need to earn their own money by means of contract 
research for external commissioners. And, last but not least, over ninety percent of our 
students need to deal with practice-oriented research once they leave university. So the 
latter has a system to responsibility for equipping these students for this type of research. 
In order to give this equipment a firm and adequate basis, the question that must be 
answered is whether this shift from ‘knowledge for knowledge’ to ‘knowledge for 
change’ allows the use of the same procedures, methods and strategies as before. In this 
essay I will defend and explain the proposition that it does not.
Firstly, I will describe the development of practice-oriented research up to now, as 
well as the current state of the art in this discipline (section 1 ). Next the question is 
raised as to which methodological criteria and demands theory-oriented and practice- 
oriented scientific research need to meet (Box I in Figure 1 below). It will be argued that 
in practice-oriented research we need to meet, besides the well-known criterion of 
(epistemological) validity, the criterion of utility of the results. According to van de Vail 
(1980) I will call this implementary validity. On analysis this criterion appears to be 
very complex and to contain at least fourteen sub-criteria (section 2 ). To answer the 
question what the relevance is of both epistemological and implementary validity for 
modern social science research, we need to distinguish not only between theory-oriented 
and practice-oriented research. We also need to differentiate between two categories of 
the latter, i.e. N-type and n-type research (Box II, and section 3). Both can be focused 
on two types of practical problems that need to be solved, i.e. improvement problems 
and construction problems. In order to find out which methodology each of these two 
types of problems requires, two generic models for addressing these problems are pre­
sented, i.e. the intervention cycle and design cycle (Box III, and section 4 ).
In section 5 a start is made to answer the main question of this essay: whether 
practice-oriented research needs a methodology of its own, different from the one for 
theory-oriented research. In answering this question I will follow Figure 1 as a guide-
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m e th o d o lo g ic a l 
c rite r ia  /  d e m a n d s  I
re se a rc h  s tr a te g ie s IV  *
c - in te rv e n tio n  c y c le
- d e s ig n  c y c le  III
th e o ry -o r ie n te d  re se a rc h  
N -ty p e  p ra ct . or. re se a rc h  
n -ty p e  p ra c t . or. re se a rc h
Figure 1. The im portance o f  research strategies, m ethodological dem ands and the intervention 
and design cycle, for theory-oriented, and the N-type and n-type o f  practice-oriented research. 
X  - - ►  Y  = utility or im portance o f  X  for Y
line. I first briefly describe seven research strategies from which researchers can choose 
(Box IV). Then I will scrutinize what the utility or importance is of these strategies for 
fulfilling the methodological demands on the one hand (arrow a), and of the latter for 
theory-oriented, and the N-type and n-type of practice-oriented research on the other 
(arrow b). From this it may in part be logically derived what the utility is of the research 
strategies for the three types of research mentioned above (arrow c). Next it will be 
evaluated what is the utility of the research strategies for addressing improvement 
problems and construction problems, i.e. for the different stages in the intervention 
and the design cycle, respectively (arrow d). In finishing this section 5, I will point out 
what is the importance of the intervention cycle and the design cycle for the three main 
types of research (arrow e).
The next question that needs to be answered is whether all this covers the whole 
difference between theory-oriented and practice-oriented research. I will explain why 
the answer must be no. The reason is that the above is confined to the context of justifica­
tion, with blank spots in the contexts of discovery and implementation and in imple- 
mentary validity (section 6). Moreover, part of the responsibility of a practice-oriented 
researcher relates to the moral correctness of research results. It’s argued that as a con­
sequence of the shift in contexts already mentioned, we need to introduce ethical validity 
as an important criterion for practice-oriented research (section 7 ).
Finally the question will be answered what can be concluded from the analyses in 
this essay and to which methodological developments and innovations in the future 
they hopefully will lead (section 8).
W H Y  A M E T H O D O L O G Y  F O R  P R A C T I C E - O R I E N T E D  R E S E A R C H  IS A N E C E S S A R Y  H E R E S Y
1 . T H E  ST A T E  O E T H E  A R T
Although mainstream research in the social, policy and management sciences is theory- 
oriented, there has always been a debate about the (need for) practical relevance of 
science. In the last few decades this debate has taken place under the heading of utiliza­
tion of knowledge. This discussion takes as its starting point a conceptual use of scientific 
knowledge (Shadish et al 1995). This refers to the influence that scientific knowledge 
has on the ideas and practices of professionals in social life. In this enlightenment func­
tion of science there is no question of transfer of knowledge but of a, partly unconscious, 
diffuse process of influencing. This process not only runs via media such as books and 
articles, as well as radio, television and internet, but also via education of young people 
in schools. For instance, much of what once was the result of hard scientific experi­
mentation later becomes part of the teaching material at universities. Next it enters the 
curricula of high schools, and finally it is offered to children in elementary schools as 
fixed ideas and truisms.
Since the 1980s there has been a rise of practice and competence-oriented disci­
plines in the social sciences, such as public administration, policy sciences, organiza­
tion theory and business administration. Here there was a clear tendency towards an 
instrumental use of science and its products (Shadish et al, 1995). The aim is to directly 
influence social and technological reality. Little by little utility rises as an important 
quality criterion for scientific research. At first this process took place in the above- 
mentioned competence-oriented disciplines. But, in the last decade the demand of utility 
has also gained importance in settled social sciences such as psychology, sociology and 
anthropology. This is part of the ‘scolarization’ of society. To quote Malhotra Bentz and 
Shapiro: ‘As work in advanced industrial society has become more knowledge-based, social 
and human science research has moved farther out of the exclusive domain of academia into 
the world of work and business' (Malhotra Bentz and Shapiro, 1998:4 ).
The question may be asked to what extent this change was accompanied by a 
change in research methodology. One of the first to ask this question in the Netherlands 
was van de Vail. In a publication in 1980 he broke a lance for developing what he called 
‘social policy research towards a self-reliant discipline with a methodology of its own’. 
He was surprised that in the discussion about social science research no distinction was 
made between the social research at universities on the one hand, and social policy 
research in practice on the other. He worried that this in his words ‘mono-paradigmatic 
approach' in social science research made unreasonable demands on researchers. ‘For 
instance, on the one hand they are supposed to fulfil epistemological requirements of social 
science knowledge building, and on the other to meet the implementary demands of social 
policy development' (van de Vail 1980:19 ). With epistemological demands or validity he 
means as truthful and exact a diagnosis of the social problem as possible'. And with 
implementary validity he means that research must offer a strong foundation for 
‘...designing policy alternatives and developing concrete policy' (van de Vail 1980: 29). His
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objection comes down to the proposition that policy research at that time mainly used 
mainstream methodology. The problem with this practice is that since the 1940s this 
methodology was mainly developed within a scientific practice that may be character­
ized as science in an ivory tower, with its claim of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. This 
methodology was thus developed within research tradition where resolving theoretical 
problems and building theory was the primary aim, for which an epistemological validity 
was the criterion to be met. It was not made for practice-oriented research, designed to 
solve practical problems and for which an implementary validity was the primary issue.
In the last few decades there have been two domains in the social, policy and 
management sciences where practice-oriented research played a central role, i.e. policy 
research in the domain of public administration and policy sciences on the one hand, 
and organizational research in public and private organizations and in the management 
sciences on the other. Examples of the first are: Birkland 20 0 1, Cochran and Malone 
1995, Coleman 1972 , Lynn and Stein 1999, Mayer and Greenwood 1980 , Sabatier 1999, 
Weis 1986. Research literature in the domain of management sciences is to be found 
under a variety of labels: Business research (Bryman and Bell 2003 , Jankowicz 2005), 
management research (Gummesson 2000 , de Beuckelaer 2005), organizational research 
(Cassell and Symon 1994, Lee 1999), applied research (Bickman and Rog 1998) and marketing 
research (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2 0 0 1, Malhotra and Birks 20 0 0 ).
However, the methodological basis of these domains remained weak. There are at 
least three erroneous beliefs of scientists that are responsible for this state of affairs: 
(a) practice-oriented research is no task for science and universities, (b) no methodo­
logically relevant difference between theory-oriented and practice-oriented research, 
and (c) practice-oriented research involves applying existing policy and management 
theories and existing methodology. These three reasons will be briefly elaborated below.
(a) Practice-oriented research is not a task for science: The first reason for being behind of 
research methodology is the belief that practice-oriented research does not deserve an 
independent position in science and at universities. One part of this view is the belief 
that practice-oriented research does not belong to the domain of scientific research. 
The soundness of this position depends on the answer to the question what is meant by 
scientific. There are three possibilities, relating to the product, the methods or the object 
of research. The first meaning of scientific is that research provides a contribution to 
science, i.e. theoretical knowledge. The second meaning is that the research is carried 
out following scientific criteria and using scientifically approved procedures, methods 
and strategies. And following the third meaning the research takes human practices, 
such as strategic management and public policy as the object. Practice-oriented research 
as it is elaborated here is not scientific in the first sense, but it is in the second and third 
meaning. That is, practice-oriented research as it is carried out by social scientists, 
should meet scientific-methodological criteria and procedures, and should take human 
practices as its object. Many proponents of the view that practice-oriented research
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does not belong to the realm of science believe that criteria for practice-oriented research 
are easier to fulfil than those for theory-oriented research. However, as will be explained 
in the following sections, the opposite is true; it m ust fulfil more and more complex 
criteria than theory-oriented research.
In the opinion of the adversaries of an independent position of practice-oriented 
research the task of science and of universities is autonomous knowledge production, 
not hindered by locally defined demands and circumstances. Most probably this view is 
fed by a deeply rooted double conviction handed down through several generations of 
scholars. The first is that science only should be involved with epistemological validity, 
instead of implementary validity. That is, not utility but tru th  is the primary concern of 
science, where tru th  is defined as ‘correspondence with empirical reality’. The second 
conviction of traditional science during the second half of the last century is the emphasis 
on external validity as the main criterion for an epistemological validity. One of the 
arguments that are given for this state of affairs is that general theoretical knowledge is 
needed to intervene in reality in a responsible way. In this view practice-oriented research 
that aims at context-bound results is ‘wicked’ (see Swanborn 1989).
This development to a large extent is a rem nant of positivism  in science during the 
second half of the last century. This scientific streaming is based on the doctrine of 
non-normative or value-free science. It states that the results of scientific research 
should be influenced as little as is possible by the values and norms of the researcher. 
The background of this claim for value-free science is tha t normative propositions can’t 
be tested on empirical grounds. And the latter in its turn is against the positivistic doc­
trine of taking sensory observation as the basis for science. Thus, in this view, values 
and normative propositions m ust be excluded from science.
(b) There is no relevant difference: A second reason why research methodologists have 
paid little attention to practice-oriented research, i.e. policy research and organizational 
research, may be the conviction of many scholars that there are no methodologically 
relevant differences between theory-oriented and practice-oriented research. As a result, 
most scholars think tha t traditional (theory-oriented) research methodology can be 
used without any problem, despite a change in the direction of practice-oriented research. 
Correspondingly, current education in research methodology at universities is still 
roughly the same as it was several decades ago, the time that science exclusively aimed 
at developing a body of knowledge. More details about this will follow in section 6. In 
this view paying methodological attention to practice-oriented research would be a waste 
of time and energy, given the availability of an outstanding research methodology, 
which we should use instead of searching for new methodologies. Briefly the argument 
is not to reinvent the wheel.
(c) Practice-oriented research means applying know-how: A third im portant reason that 
practice-oriented research has a weak methodological basis is the erroneous concep­
tion that the characteristic feature of this type of research is to be found in its content
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rather than in its form (read methodology). For an explanation and foundation of this 
belief we need to look at the way policy research and organizational research developed 
over the last few decades. These were and still are strongly based on knowledge and 
insights from public administration and organization theory, respectively, knowledge 
that must be applied. A clear indication of this conception is the often used term applied 
research for practice-oriented research. This term shows ignorance of the essence of 
any research, i.e. the production of new knowledge. In this new type of research strategies 
and methods are applied, rather than adapting these methods or creating new ones. As 
a result, so far material knowledge from public administration and business administra­
tion has been essential for policy and organizational researchers, besides knowledge from 
existing (theory-oriented) methodology. Correspondingly, when young researchers 
leave university hardly any specific research methodology for this type of research is 
part of their toolkit.
The policy analysis approach came across from the United States, where pragma­
tism was a leading approach since the thirties of the last century. According to Dewey, 
one of its most important proponents, knowledge is true if it is useful. As a follow-up 
to the work of Dewey and based on the assumption of manipulability of social and 
technological reality, scientists such as Lasswell and Dror (19 71) developed the policy 
sciences towards an independent interdisciplinary approach. This was based on applying 
knowledge from the social sciences, combined with know-how about policy and inter­
vention processes. Also the later developed idea of social engineering of Wildavsky 
( 1992) and Parsons (1995) still makes part of the tradition of applying existing, rather 
than producing new knowledge.
A clear example of this strongly intrinsic approach to practice-oriented research is 
diagnostic research. For most professionals in the domain of public policy and organiza­
tion management, diagnosis means looking at a problematic reality from the perspec­
tive of normative or prescriptive theories, i.e. theories that say how reality should be. 
This reveals itself in the type of chosen objects and perspectives of the problem solver, 
in the concepts and theories that are used, and in the exclusive use of the intervention 
cycle or policy cycle as a frame of reference (see Verschuren 2008 , and section 4 of this 
essay). However, in my view this is the task of the professional problem solver. In con­
trast, a practice-oriented researcher should aim at the production of new knowledge. In 
the case of diagnostic research this means describing and explaining the problem to be 
solved. The argument comes down to the search for time and context-bound knowledge 
and insights of the problem at hand, more than the use of (pre-existing) general theo­
retical knowledge (see also Verschuren 2008 ).
We also find this emphasis on intrinsic policy research in van Hoesels’ book repre­
senting the state of the art of policy research in the Netherlands (Van Hoesel et al, 
2005). Policy research in their view is mainly policy analysis. They hardly attribute any 
specific methodology to this type of research. I do not object to the use of public policy
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theory as such, as an important ingredient of problem solving is the use of what is already 
known about the problem at hand. My objection is that practice-oriented research as 
they see it rather can be characterized as policy science and policy analysis instead of as 
policy research or, more general, as practice-oriented research, for which we need a 
special methodology (see Verschuren 2006 ).
Another aspect of intrinsic policy research which negates the need for a special 
methodology for practice-oriented research is the belief that the use of theoretical, read 
generalized, abstract and law-like knowledge, is superior to that of practical and context- 
bound knowledge (see Swanborn 1989). From this belief follows the confusion of practice- 
oriented research as a discipline with its own objective of (context-bound) knowledge 
production on the one hand and a strong emphasis on (applying) general theoretical 
knowledge on the other.
The conclusion is that little has changed in policy research since van de Vail some 
thirty years ago complained about the lack of research methodology for practice-oriented 
research, other than an ongoing development of methodology that mainly suits theory- 
oriented research. The same goes for organizational research. Here too we mainly see a 
mix of applying organizational and management theory on the one hand, and existing 
research strategies and methods on the other.
2 . T H E  C R I T E R I O N  O E I M P L E M E N T A R Y  V A L I D I T Y
In this section I will scrutinize the criterion of utility or implementary validity. How­
ever, for reasons of both comparison and relevance for practice-oriented research I will 
first briefly m ention settled criteria of mainstream social, policy and management 
science research. The two best known criteria are internal and external validity. Before I 
called these epistemological validity, as it is about the question as to whether the knowledge 
produced is true. Here the touchstone tha t is used for being true is correspondence 
with empirical reality. Another word for external validity is the ‘generalizability’ of the 
results of research.
Two additional settled requirements are verifiability and cumulativity. The criterion 
of verifiability involves the demand tha t it should be possible for people other than the 
researchers to check what the latter exactly did and whether they followed methodo­
logical sound procedures. This in principle means that the research material or data on 
which the research was based must be open to the public and that the researcher is fully 
clear about the way he or she designed and carried out the project. Finally cumulativity 
means tha t the knowledge produced contributes to building a body of knowledge or 
theory. In order to achieve this, the researcher needs, for instance, to link the research 
to existing theories, to use the concepts and their definitions from these theories, and 
to make use of standardized and validated measurement instruments or scales.
The four above-mentioned criteria are well known in mainstream mainly theory- 
oriented research. For that reason they are not further elaborated here. The reader is
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referred to methodological handbooks (Babbie 2007, Bernard 2 0 0 2 , Black 1999, Judd et 
al 1991). As these criteria come from inside science, they may be called internal scientific 
criteria. Although they were mainly developed for theory-oriented research, they also 
play a role in practice-oriented research. In particular, internal validity and verifiability 
are im portant in most practice-oriented research. Less so do the criteria of external 
validity and cumulativity.
As already argued in the last section, for practice-oriented research with its external 
goal, i.e. resolving a practical problem, we need the criterion of utility or im plem entary  
validity. It’s defined as the extent to which the knowledge produced can help to bring 
about an intended change in reality, either improving existing reality or constructing a 
new artefact. In section 4 I will call these two cases improvement and construction 
problems, respectively. More specifically, the main question tha t needs to be answered 
as to implementary validity is: Is the knowledge useful for solving the problem to be 
addressed, or for creating and making the artefact to be developed function well?
The distinction between implementary and epistemological validity is not obvious. 
For those who are not convinced of an independent position of practice-oriented research 
besides mainstream theory-oriented research, there are several possibilities, (a) They 
don’t  see any difference between the two types of validity, (b) they think that epistemo­
logical validity is the only im portant thing for social science and/or (c) they believe 
tha t the distinction does not make a difference as a criterion for scientific research. In 
all these cases the main question of this essay, whether we need a methodology for 
practice-oriented research tha t differs from the one for theory-oriented research, must 
be answered with no. Despite these believes the difference between epistemological and 
implementary validity appears to be considerable and peculiar as well. An elaboration 
is postponed towards the end of this section, once we have a better understanding of 
the complex criterion of implementary validity.
Of course, the criterion of implementary validity or utility is not new; it has been 
used already for decades in evaluating the results of practice-oriented research. However, 
it never was thoroughly analyzed by research methodologists. This might be a reason 
why there are quite often complaints about the utility and actual use of the results of 
policy research and organizational research. Upon analysis the criterion of utility appears 
to be very complex. I started my analysis by formulating three main factors tha t may 
affect the implementary validity of knowledge as defined above. (1 ) Characteristics of 
the object of research. That is, for supporting an intervention or the construction of an 
artefact with useful knowledge we need to select the right object of research, and do the 
selection in the right way. (2 ) The way we look at this object. For instance, we can do 
this in a holistic or reductionist way. (3) Last but not least, a factor that determines the 
utility of knowledge is the claims of the selected object. Here we have another clear 
distinction with theoretical knowledge. This is that in practice-oriented research the 
target population or stakeholders themselves m ust be able and ready to use or imple-
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Context of justification Context of discovery
Internal scientific External scientific (practice-oriented)
(theory-oriented) Object of research Needs o f stakeholders Type of knowledge
1 in tern a l v a lid ity 5 v a r ia b ility 1 0  c o m p re h e n s ib ility 14  h olism
2 e x te rn a l v a lid ity 6 n e w  p h e n o m en o n 11  a c c e p ta b ility 15  in te rd isc ip lin a r ity
3 v e r ifia b ili ty 7 (grou p ) p ro c e ss e s 12  le g itim a cy 16  c o n te x t  re stra in t
4  c u m u la tiv ity 8 in te rc o n n e c te d n e s s
9 sm all ta rg e t  p o p u lation
13  re s . a s  le arn in g  p ro c . 17  p ro fo u n d n e ss
18  m a n ip u la b ility
Figure 2. Overview o f methodological demands for scientific research
m ent the artefact or knowledge produced. In the determining factors described above 
we recognize three distinctive contexts, which are scrutinized in sections 6 and 7 below,
i.e. the contexts of discovery, justification  and im plem entation , respectively.
Starting my analysis with these three approaches, I found by means of logical and 
semantic analysis fourteen sub-criteria and demanding issues for implementary validity. 
I have divided them into three categories. These are sub-criteria/demands relating to
(a) the object of research or the problem to be solved, (b) the needs of the stakeholders as to 
the research and its results and, (c) the type of knowledge to be produced (see Figure 2 ).
There is a difference between the second column in Figure 2 relating to the object 
of research on the one hand, and the rest of the criteria in this figure on the other. This 
last category (columns 1 , 3 and 4 ) act as criteria or standards tha t may be threatened by 
all kinds of disturbing mechanisms, errors, biases, and fallacies. For instance, the in ­
ternal (epistemological) validity may be threatened by biasing mechanisms such as 
strategic answers, reactivity, social desirability and ecological fallacy. In contrast, the 
issues in the second column are not criteria, but features of the object tha t ask for 
methodological attention. But what the latter have in common with the criteria in the 
other three columns is that they all are issues tha t should be met by, and tha t put con­
straints on, the research at hand. Below the criteria and issues in the columns 2 , 3 and 
4 are explained. Besides, I will give some first ideas relating to the methodological con­
sequences of these issues (see Figure 3). In section 5 these consequences will be dis­
cussed at length.
Two remarks should be made before discussing the criteria and demanding issues. 
Firstly, the reader is warned tha t several of them are highly interconnected. Examples 
are the sub-criteria holism, interdisciplinarity and context restraint. Another example 
forms the issues in the third column of Figure 2 . As will be pointed out below they 
form, looking top down, a cumulative order. This does not detract from the fact that 
each of these criteria has its own demands, both as to research methodology and its 
possible contribution to biasing implementary validity. A second remark is that unrav-
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Issue Criteria and demanding issues Methodological need for...
Object of the research 5. v a r ia b ility
6 . n e w  p h e n o m en o n
7. (gro u p ) p r o c e ss e s
8 . in te rc o n n e c te d n e s s
9 . sm all ta r g e t  p o p u la tio n
- >  f le x ib le  re se a rc h  d e s ig n
- >  s t r a t e g y  n e e d in g  little  p r io r  k n o w led g e
- >  lo n g itu d in a l re se a rc h
- >  in d e p e n d e n t  o b se rv a t io n /d a ta  g a th e r in g
- >  s t r a t e g y  n e e d in g  o n ly  fe w  re se a rc h  u n its
Needs of the 
target population
10 . c o m p re h e n s ib ility  
n .  a c c e p ta b ility
12 . le g itim a cy
13 . re se a rc h  a s  a le a rn in g  p roc .
- >  re se a rc h  s t r a t e g y  c lo s e  t o  co m m o n  s e n s e  
- >  c o m p re h e n s ib ility  
- >  a c c e p ta b ility  / d e m o c r a t ic  re se a rc h  
- >  o p e n  d e s ig n  a p p ro ac h  /  f le x ib le  d e s ig n
Knowledge to be 
produced
14 .  h olism
15 . in te rd isc ip lin a r ity
16 . c o n te x t  re stra in t
17 . p ro fo u n d n e ss
18 . m a n ip u la b ility
- >  o p e n  e n d e d , q u a lita t iv e  a p p ro ac h  
- >  o b se rv . tr ia n g u l. /  p a r tic ip a to ry  re se a rc h  
- >  id e o g ra p h ic  ap p ro ach  
- >  in te n s iv e  re se a rc h  /  q u a lita t iv e  a p p ro ac h  
- >  n o  m e th o d o lo g ic a l re c ip e  a v a ila b le
Figure 3. Criteria and demanding issues for practice-oriented research, and one or two o f the main methodological 
requirements that therefore should be met
elling these sub-criteria, although this was done for the sake of implementary validity, 
may be also highly relevant for epistemological validity. For instance, one may ask 
whether reductionist and superficial knowledge, representing the opposite of holism 
and profoundness (numbers 14  and 17 ), is detrimental to the epistemological validity 
of knowledge (see also the end of section 8). I leave this question to other methodolo­
gists and researchers.
The object o f  research
The next five sub-criteria relating to characteristics of the object of research may differ 
gradually, rather than fundamentally, from the situation in a theory-oriented research.
(5) Variability: In theory-oriented research we mostly study phenomena such as employ­
ability, terrorism, criminality, pollution of the environment etcetera, rather than inci­
dental happenings. Such phenomena most often have a relatively stable character; they 
do not change every day. Moreover, in this type of research we mostly aim at the com­
monality of these separate phenomena, and we are searching for patterns and general 
laws. In contrast, in practice-oriented research we primarily need to look for uniqueness 
of phenomena and their links to the local context (see point 16 ). A consequence of this 
state of affairs is that we need research strategy that is flexible and tha t permits rapid 
changes in the research design if necessary. An extra reason for flexibility is tha t in the 
beginning of research it is often not yet clear what the problem to be solved exactly is.
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After a while, the problem at hand may appear not to be what it looked like at first, and 
the research issue and the resulting technical research design m ust be changed.
(6) New phenomenon: The object of a practice-oriented research often consists of new 
phenomena that recently came into being. The reason is that just with new objects and 
phenomena there may raise problems. And in case a newly produced artefact needs to 
be evaluated; this field is still in its infancy, requiring adaptations and improvements. 
Research designed to support these and suchlike cases should not need much priory 
knowledge, for the simple reason that this knowledge does not yet exist. For instance, a 
quantitative survey must to a large extent be designed beforehand. It thus needs suffi­
cient knowledge in order to be able to take the right decisions. For that reason in general 
qualitative research and approaches that follow an open design strategy are preferred 
here (see Verschuren 2009 , chapter 12 ).
(7 ) Importance of (group) processes: For problem solving, which in principle means inter­
vening in social and/ or technological reality, it is often im portant to have knowledge of 
processes, rather than  of the products of these processes. This is especially the case 
relating to group processes, such as developing criminality in a district, the integration 
(or lack thereof) of foreigners, insufficient cooperation in work teams, etc. Before inter­
vening successfully in a social group, the interventionist must know the social mecha­
nisms at work.
For instance, in order to achieve better communication and cooperation between 
group members, it is useful to know how processes of communication and cooperation 
actually work. For this task longitudinal research is preferable. In general, qualitative 
research designs are more suited for this task than quantitative designs (see Verschuren 
2009 ).
(8) Interconnectedness of research units: In small groups everybody knows each other. 
This may especially happen in an n-type of practice-oriented research (see section 3). 
Here the group members often communicate and interact intensively with each other. 
And most of the time they have strongly contradicting stakes. The result is tha t interest 
bonds may come into being with strong in-group and controversial out-group attitudes. 
All this puts pressure on the fundam ental methodological demand of independent 
observation in evidence building. The latter requires labour-intensive research methods,
i.e. qualitative research strategies. There is also a link with holistic research (see point 
14  below and section 5).
(9) Small target population: Mainstream theory-oriented research in the social, policy 
and management sciences is mostly based on large samples from still much lager popu­
lations, in order to enhance the highly valued external validity of the research results 
(see section 5 below). However, the target population in practice-oriented research is 
often relatively small. Moreover, as we often need context-bound knowledge for problem 
solving, there may be a preference for dividing a large population in several subpopula­
tions (see also point 16 below). Thus we need a research strategy tha t requires only a
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relatively low number of research units. This excludes, for instance, most quantitative 
research.
Needs o f  stakeholders
Another set of sub-criteria to be met in order to achieve implementary validity relates 
to the needs of the stakeholders and/or the target population. These needs result from 
the fact that the stakeholders or members of the target population themselves often 
m ust do something with the knowledge tha t is being produced. These sub-criteria form 
a cumulative series, as the process model below shows. In this type of model X— *-Y 
means: X m ust have been done, achieved or realized before Y can be done, achieved or 
realized. (See Verschuren 2008 for more details about this type of model).
c o m p re h e n s io n  | --------------►  | a c c e p ta n c e  | -------------- le g it im a c y  |-------------------- ► [  le arn in g
In words this model says: An individual must understand a proposition or a text, i.e. the 
knowledge or artefact to be produced with a research, before he or she can accept it. The 
latter in its turn  is a precondition for finding it legitimate, which m ust have been 
achieved before it is possible to learn from it. Each element in this series adds some­
thing to the former.
( 10 ). Com prehensibility: As an example, imagine that the members of a target group 
need to change or adapt their beliefs, opinions, attitudes and/or behaviour. This may be 
needed to bring about a desirable change in the functioning of this group. The first 
thing that is needed then is tha t the group members understand the results of the re­
search. Often they also need to understand the way these results were produced. The 
consequence of this is that highly sophisticated research is less useful than approaches 
tha t are closer to common sense, such as qualitative research strategies.
( 1 1 ) Acceptability: The understanding of the research results by the target population is 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for their acceptance. The members of the target 
population should also recognize these results as relevant, as representing their values, 
beliefs and opinions, and as fitting their needs and demands. For this the researcher 
m ust communicate with them openly and intensively, and use for instance reflective 
techniques such as empathy and introspection. More generally, acceptability once more 
requires the use of research methods and procedures tha t come close to common sense. 
For more information about these subject matters the interested reader is referred to 
Verschuren 2010  (forthcoming). Another option is action research. This is a form of 
research where there is no clear difference between the researchers and the researched. 
For more information the interested reader is referred to Whitehead 1994 and Verschuren 
2010  (forthcoming).
( 12 ) Legitimacy: The stakeholders and members of the target population m ust also per­
ceive the knowledge and the way it is produced as legitimate. In order to achieve this,
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the researcher must, for instance, be able to handle differences in power between those 
involved. He or she should be able to avoid the dominance of powerful stakeholders 
over the less powerful.
(13 ) Research as a learning process: As already stated, the members of the target popula­
tion are often actively involved in processes of change in general and organizational 
change in particular. It’s im portant that they get feedback on their behaviour, which is 
an instance of learning. This learning function can often be fulfilled by practice-oriented 
research, especially in the form of evaluation research. More specifically process evalua­
tion and formative evaluation are at stake here. Besides this form of learning as 'feedback 
upon ac tion ’ the people involved can also learn in the form of ‘exploration in ac tion ’. 
Here too research may play an im portant role. More specifically the strategy of action 
research can be used. Another option is the use of an open design strategy (see Verschuren 
2009 , section 10 .5).
Type o f  knowledge
A  third and last category of sub-criteria for implementary validity relates to the type of 
knowledge to be produced in the research. Just as in the last category, most of them are 
interconnected.
(14 ) H olistic knowledge: In philosophy holism simply means; studying a phenomenon as 
a whole. However, in empirical science we need to make this concept operational. When 
it comes to sensory observation, holism bears three aspects. These relate to the way the 
object is: (a) selected, (b) treated and (c) observed. I will describe them briefly.
(a) The selection of the object: This aspect of holism has two modalities. The first 
is selection of an entire phenomenon instead of an aspect or part of it. The opposite of 
this aspect of holism is specialization  in science. This is what happened in the last half 
century, when the empirical domain of scientists became - and is still becoming - 
smaller and smaller. To an increasing extent scientists know more about less. The second 
modality relates to the question as to whether we look at a phenomenon itself, or at an 
artificial created dummy. The second alternative again is an opposite of holism, and is 
called experim entation. Although building a dummy necessarily means reductionism in 
one respect, it may contribute to holism in another. That is, in a dummy we necessarily 
loose details, but we may win holism with respect to the opportunities it offers in the 
domain of observation (see c below) and evidence building.
(b) The trea tm en t of the object: Here holism means to treat the selected object as 
a whole, instead of unravelling it into particles and aspects. The opposite of this is ana­
lytical reductionism . The latter has two components: (a) the object is analytically divided 
into observation units (first reduction) and (b) the latter is conceived as a set of variables 
(second reduction). For instance, instead of looking at work teams as a whole (research 
units), we look a tthe  individual members of the teams (observation units). And instead 
of observing these people, the latter in their turn are conceived as a set of characteristics,
22 P R O F .  P I E T  J . M .  V E R S C H U R E N
the variables. This is what happens in mainstream quantitative social science research. 
The weak point of this approach is tha t the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
Holistic research then means tha t we make observations of the teams as a whole. The 
difference with the former aspect (a) of holism is tha t this belongs to the context of 
discovery, whereas the second aspect relates to the context of justification.
(c) The observation  of the object: Here too are two closely related modalities. The 
first relates to data gathering and the second to observation. As to data gathering we 
can make a difference between data in v ivo  on the one hand, and recorded data on the 
other. ‘In vivo’ means that we gather data directly from the object itself, w ithout an 
intermediate. In contrast, the sources of recorded data are media and documents that 
deliver data from or about the object. In accordance with common sense and other 
things being equal, data gathered in vivo are closer to holism than recorded data do. For 
more information over these distinctions see Verschuren 2009 , chapter 13 .
As to the act of observation we need to study an object in its context. This issue also 
has two aspects; a spatial and a tem poral aspect. The first means observation of the object 
in relationship to its physical and social environment. The second involves following an 
object in its development through time, i.e. in the past as well as in the future. Not doing 
either of the two or both m ust in fact be qualified as a tunnel v iew .
To sum up, in empirical research holism means studying the entire object instead of 
an aspect or a part of it (specialization), studying the real life object instead of a dummy 
(experimentation), looking at the object as a whole instead of at its separate aspects 
and particles (analytical reduction), gathering in vivo data instead of recorded data, 
and studying the object in its time and space context instead of studying it isolated 
(tunnel view). In this series the second alternative indicates instances of reductionism , 
as the opposite of holism. For more information about holism and reductionism in 
empirical research see Verschuren 2 0 0 1.
( 15) In terdiscip linary knowledge: Closely related to the argument of holism is the need 
for an interdisciplinary approach. In order to get insight in all the aspects and parts of the 
problem at hand and the way they interact with each other, we should approach it from 
different angles and perspectives. Although interdisciplinarity is a necessary condition 
for holism, the reverse is not necessarily true. Neither is interdisciplinarity a sufficient 
condition for holism.
There are three reasons why (the resolution of) practical problems cut across 
existing disciplines. The first is that most problems have multiple causes. For instance, 
juvenile delinquency may have economical, social, psychological and biological back­
grounds. In principle, each single discipline may contribute to the solution of the 
problem. However, if the causes interact with each other, which is often the case, then 
only an interaction of disciplines may solve the problem (see also Ragin 1987, with his 
idea of multiple conjunctural causation).
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A second reason for the importance of interdisciplinary research is to be found in the 
reason w h y  we define something as a problem. For instance, absence due to illness may 
be defined as a problem because it harms the well-being of the employee, the atmosphere 
of the working team or leads to poor organization of tasks. As is well known from inter­
vention methodology, the solution to a problem to a large extent depends on its effects 
(see Verschuren 2008 ). So, interdisciplinary knowledge about these different effects 
may appear to be valuable, especially if the various consequences interact with each 
other.
A third and last reason for interdisciplinarity is that a solution to a problem must 
often fulfil several side-conditions. For instance, an intervention designed to reduce 
pollution may need to meet administrative, juridical, economical and infra-structural 
restrictions. Exact knowledge about these conditions may then be needed in order to 
achieve a perm anent solution of the problem at hand.
(16 ) C ontext-bound knowledge: As already stated, in most cases problems are strongly 
embedded in and interwoven with the local social, political and technological context. 
For that reason, different from theory-oriented research with its focus on finding general 
(read context-free) and law-like knowledge, practice-oriented research should study 
this context and the way it interacts with the object of the research. This argument seems 
to deny the possible role that general theories can play in practice-oriented research. 
However, general theories can, for instance, be used in the first stage of diagnosis, as 
they can often indicate the direction for finding the causes of the problem at hand. 
Once it is clear in which domains the causes of the problem at hand may be found, the 
researcher m ust look further into the context in order to verify the agency of the 
cause(s) in tha t particular case and to obtain details aboutthe process(es) of causation 
at hand.
(17 ) Profoundness: In-depth knowledge may be an im portant condition for solving a 
problem. It may mean, for instance, the search for deeper causes instead of symptoms. 
The deeper the causes we tackle, the more sustainable a solution may be, other things 
being equal (see also Verschuren 2008 ). It may also mean the study of processes instead 
of just the outcomes of these processes (see point 7 above). For instance, imagine that we 
want to improve an intervention or a new artefact once it is executed or implemented. 
Then, in most cases, we’d better carry out a formative process evaluation of the way the 
intervention was carried out or the artefact was produced and/or implemented, than 
just a summative product evaluation of (the effectiveness of) the outcomes. And if we 
want something to change in the minds of people, we need a profound insight in their 
motives, perceptions and attitudes, rather than in their characteristics such like age, 
the am ount and type of education, or type of job.
(18 ) M anipu lability: The (epistemological) validity of knowledge is not sufficient for 
being useful in problem solving. The knowledge should also regard phenomena that 
can be changed by the researcher or problem-solver. For instance, many researchers have
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found tha t the social class of children has an effect on their performances at school; 
higher class children in general perform better than lower class children do. Yet the 
results of the latter cannot be improved on the basis of this knowledge, as social class 
cannot be changed. Fulfilling the demand of manipulability is simply a matter of selec­
tion by the researcher. No methodological measures are available. More about the rela­
tion between validity and utility of knowledge in the section to follow.
Truth versus u tility
Once we know more about what implementary validity means and the considerable 
number of aspects it contains, the differences between epistemological and implemen­
tary validity, or between tru th  and utility, can be considered. As already stated, this 
relationship has several peculiar aspects. For a difference between the two, in principle 
we need to look at the columns 2 , 3 and 4 in Figure 2 , as these relate to the criterion of 
utility, whereas column 1 primarily relates to epistemological validity. However, the 
issues in column 2 are not relevant for defining a difference between epistemological 
and implementary validity, as they are not linked to knowledge but to the production  of 
knowledge. That is, they represent possible difficulties that especially a practice-oriented 
researcher is likely to encounter and that he or she m ust address.
In contrast, the sub-criteria in column 3 are at the heart of this distinction. On 
little reflection they make clear that objective or inter subjective tru th  is not sufficient 
for being useful for resolving practical problems. The target population should also per­
ceive it as true. To say it analogically to a well-known expression: tru th  is in the m ind o f  
the ow ner. The issues in column 3 are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for 
achieving subjective truth. In column 4 too are sub-criteria that make clear tha t tru th  
is not sufficient for successfully intervening in reality. A first issue relates to reductionism  
as the opposite of holism and interdisciplinarity (see point 14  and 15 above). Most 
aspects of reductionism can be seen as the cornerstones of mainstream social science 
research. For instance, specialization contributed extremely to the explosion of scien­
tific theoretical knowledge over the last half century, where epistemological validity by 
far was and is the most im portant criterion. This was and is still possible because each 
piece of knowledge contributes to the accumulation of knowledge in theories. However, 
specialization is unfavourable or even much of a problem, for intervening in social reality,
i.e. for implementary validity. For the latter we preferably need insight into the whole 
object of the intervention, as well as into the way it is connected to its context in time 
and space. One reason for this is that w ithout this knowledge we will not know what all 
the side-effects of an intervention or an artefact may be, which can make it hazardous 
and irresponsible. Another effect may be that we only find out about one or two causes 
of the problem to be solved. This can be a particular problem if there are several inter­
acting causes of the problem to be solved. Here Ragin’s mechanism of ‘m ultiple conjunc­
t u r e  causation' is at stake (Ragin 1987).
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Moreover, most problems that are studied by practice-oriented researchers are a problem 
tangle, consisting of several interwoven aspects, and having a strong entanglement with 
its context. For that reason, designed to achieve a thorough and permanent solution of 
the problem, practice-oriented researchers should try to produce holistic knowledge as 
much as is possible. Other things being equal, in general qualitative and participatory 
research strategies fit better the aim of holism than quantitative and reflective research 
do (see section 5). And, as to the way of generating the research material, in vivo data and 
observation in principle produce more holistic knowledge than stimulus-response tech­
niques such as interviews and written questionnaires do.
Another issue to be taken into account is context restraint. There are arguments 
why general and abstract theoretical knowledge, although it is true, may not be useful 
in a particular situation. These arguments are closely connected to holism. For instance, 
causal agencies may need special circumstances in order to get active. In research 
methodology this is an instance of the well-known mechanism of statistical interac­
tion. The working of (a set of) causes may also depend on the history of the object at 
hand. Moreover, according to the principle of multiple conjunctural causation, a causal 
mechanism may consist of a series of interacting causes. W hether this mechanism is 
active and, if it is, what its specific causal effect will be depends on the specific constel­
lation of this set of causes in a certain context.
Profoundness too may make a distinction between tru th  and utility. For instance, 
it may be true that X causes Y. Yet if Y is the problem, it is by no means sure that affecting 
X will bring about a sustainable change in Y. If X itself has many causes, then a change 
in X tha t is brought about by the problem solver may be soon neutralized by deeper 
causes of X that were not affected and that have a negative effect on X. Another problem 
may be the existence of other im portant direct causes of Y, besides X. If they have a 
substantial effect on Y, affecting X may bring about only a minor change in Y.
The same type of reasoning relates to the difference between ‘superficial’ causes of 
hum an beings’ behaviour on the one hand, and deeper motives on the other. Affecting 
the latter, if feasible and acceptable, mostly is more effective in bringing about changes 
in hum an behaviour than ‘external’ causes do. This is another example showing that 
qualitative research strategies may be more useful than quantitative strategies. Finally, 
the difference tha t manipulability may make between tru th  and utility, the last issue in 
column four, has already been explained.
Earlier on, we saw examples of the fact that just because something is true it’s not 
necessarily useful. The reverse is also valid; knowledge need not necessarily be true, read 
empirically tenable, in order to be useful. An example of this can be found in the concepts 
of self fulfilling and self denying prophecy. Imagine there is a surplus of carpenters on 
the labour market. Then wrongly stating tha t there will be a surplus in the future may 
cause the surplus to disappear. In general we can say that what people th in k  is true may 
be more im portant for bringing about changes in social reality than empirical validity 
does. It stands to reason tha t here ethical implications easily come into play.
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At the end of this section on the sub-criteria of implementary validity, which distin­
guishes between practice oriented and theory-oriented research, a few additional differ­
ences between the two can be mentioned. One of them is that theory-oriented research 
is carried out in an academic context, whereas practice-oriented research is done in a 
political environment. This may cause problems during implementation (see section 6). 
A methodological difference between the two is that theory-oriented research primarily 
makes use of an intellectual and comprehensive rationality, whereas the second on 
top of this m ust rely on a political and contingent rationality. That is, in the latter case, 
arguments and lines of reasoning do not only follow the rules of formal logic and ob­
jective observation. Important are matters such as power, bargaining, costs, feasibility, 
and such like. Besides, the theory-oriented researcher has a much more autonomous 
position than a practice-oriented researcher. In the first case there is no controlling 
agent other than the scientific community, which does not care what is studied, neither 
is it tha t much concerned with the context of discovery. In practice-oriented research, 
however, there is a customer with explicit demands who also often has ideas about how 
the research should be carried out. Usually there are several stakeholders with different 
conceptions of the problem at hand and contradictory demands. This forces the re­
searcher to find her or his way in this jungle of contradicting demands, to bargain and 
to reconcile different points of view. Moreover, commissioners and stakeholders often 
have unreasonable and unrealistic expectations of the researcher, so that the latter 
m ust convince them that they genuinely need support with research.
3 . N - T Y P E  V E R S U S  n - T Y P E  R E S E A R C H
In discussing the state of the art of research methodology for practice-oriented research 
in section 1 a distinction was being made between two broad areas in social, policy and 
management science research, i.e. policy research and organizational research. This is 
the realm of (a) public policy and (b) private and public organizations, respectively; the 
latter divided over for profit and not-for-profit organizations. This distinction appears 
to have sound methodological consequences, as elaborated below.
There are two main characteristics tha t make a difference between policy research 
and organizational research: (a) a public versus private domain and (b) a large versus a 
moderate or small scale, respectively. Policy research is in the public domain and is 
large scale. That is, the target population in principle exists of at least thousands of 
people, and can go up to hundreds of millions of citizens. Organizational research is 
situated in the private domain, and is relatively small scale. Here the target population 
varies between some dozens to some ten thousands of organization members. I call this 
N-type and n-type of practice-oriented research, respectively. The first lies on a macro 
level, and the second on the mezzo and micro level. In other words, in the mean the 
object of policy research has a higher level of aggregation than the object of organiza­
tional research does. This difference in scale, together with the public-private distinction, 
leads to many other methodologically relevant differences.
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In policy research as well as organizational research, the aim is to produce knowledge, 
insights and information tha t may help address a practical problem. The difference 
between a theoretical and a practical problem to be solved is what makes a theory-ori- 
ented and a practice-oriented research the most different from each other. Yet from a 
methodological point of view, as to practice-oriented research it appears to be impor­
tan t to make a difference between an N-type and n-type context. For th a t reason, in 
a discussion about the question as to whether there is a methodological difference be­
tween a theory and a practice-oriented research, this distinction between an N-type 
and an n-type context should be taken into account. There are three categories of dif­
ferences between the two: (1 ) sociological differences, (2 ) differences as to the use and 
the users of research results and (3) administrative differences. These three are briefly 
elaborated below.
(1 ) Sociological characteristics: A well-known distinction in sociology is tha t between 
groups and collectivities. There are two main differences: (a) scale and, (b) the am ount 
and type of interaction and communication between the members of the group. In an 
N-type context people only incidentally interact or communicate with one another, 
whereas in an n-type context they do this on a structural basis. In the latter case an 
intensive interaction and communication is often even an explicit prerequisite for 
adequate functioning, for instance, in manufacturing organizations. A consequence of 
this state of affairs is developing shared values, perceptions and opinions, whereas 
group processes get an in-group character. But contradictions, antagonisms, interest 
bonds, sub-cultures and the like may also arise.
Besides, the members of an N-type group most often don’t  know each other, 
whereas the members of an n-type group do. The latter to a large extent know each 
other’s perceptions and opinions, habits, behaviour, concerns and often their private 
circumstances. And they also have explicit expectations towards each other, based on 
issues such like division of tasks, responsibilities and existing formal and informal 
group norms and standards. Part of this is the existence of social control amongst the 
group members. Another difference is that in an N-type context the members of the 
community live together, whereas the members in an n-type context w ork  together. 
Moreover, in an n-type context people tend to have a social relationship to each other, 
either in a formal or an informal sense. An informal organization can be conceived as an 
interconnected set of social roles and linked role-expectations and patterns of communi­
cation. And last but not least, in an n-type context people most often have common 
goals, and from these goals deduced tasks to fulfil.
The consequence of all this is that, compared to a collectivity in an N-type con­
text, a social group is to be characterized by the phenomenon of interconnectedness, 
with the related methodological problem of an independent observation (see before). 
It also means that the researcher m ust face a small group (point 9 in Figure 2 ) so that 
analytical reductionism does not work well, that labour-intensive methods are needed 
and that the target population itself m ust apply the research results.
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(2 ) C haracteristics o f  the use and the users: As already stated, in an N-type context there 
mostly is a policy programme of interventions. This programme is carried out by pro­
fessionals, without or only incidentally being the objects of the policy themselves. They 
are trained in the use of a policy research, and also often in carrying it out themselves. 
Moreover they mostly are also skilled in policy practices. All this means that they are 
trained in translating the results of a policy research in concrete public administra­
tion.
The fact that they are not necessarily themselves the subjects of a policy makes 
them personally free of engagement, more so than when the group of users of research 
results coincides with the target population, as is often the case in an n-type context. 
After all, in the latter case the members of the organization are often themselves the 
ones to transfer these results in their own behaviour. For instance, research report may 
describe the poor way communication in an organization takes place. Then the members 
of this organization have themselves to take serious this result, and correspondingly to 
change their attitude and behaviour in this respect. This means that an n-type of practice- 
oriented research is often part of a learning process (see point 13 in Figure 2 ). In con­
trast, the citizens in an N-type context normally not themselves come in contact with 
a policy research and its results. As will be elaborated below all these differences bring 
about changes in the methodology that is needed.
(3 ) A dm in istra tive differences: Another difference is that, compared to the management of 
an organization in an n-type context, a public administration in an N-type context has 
a small span of control. The reason for this is that the power of political and administra­
tive institutions is bounded by a system of democratic and political control, in exchange 
for participation of citizens in the financing of public policy in the form of taxes. In an 
n-type organization the span of control mostly is much larger, because there is an 
explicit goal to which the members contribute in exchange with the wages tha t they 
earn. Shortly, they receive money instead of paying it, with being controlled as a price.
This large span of control opens an excellent opportunity for using the experiment 
as research strategy. The tes tin g  variant of the experiment is by far the most powerful 
instrum ent for the study of causal effects. This is, for instance, im portant in an ex post 
product evaluation of an intervention or an artefact, where a causal relation must be 
proven between the intervention and the changes that it induces, i.e. its effect(s). And an 
explorative experiment is a most valid and efficient strategy for an ex ante or ex post process 
evaluation. (See for these forms of an experimental design section 5 and Verschuren 
2010  (forthcoming)).
Besides, there are differences in the way a group (n-type context) and a collectivity 
(N-type context) is steered. In an N-type context the steering is often characterized by 
policy programmes that are designed to achieve long-term goals. Changes resulting 
from policy interventions are relatively small and incremental in nature, rather than 
radical. The reason for this is that radical and abrupt changes -  as well as dramatic
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changes in the goals of public administration -  are likely to lead to tensions, social 
turmoil and political instability, so they will be avoided. They undermine the loyalty of 
citizens and they could even disrupt society (see Shadish red. 1995). In an N-type context 
the changes brought about by the administration may be bigger, more radical and more 
frequent. This is made possible by a relatively high span of control. In section 4 it is 
elaborated that in this respect we can make a distinction between improvement problems 
and construction problems.
One may ask whether there is a correspondence between the lowest level of aggre­
gation in an N-type context, i.e. a quarter of a town on the one hand, and a private 
organization, i.e. an n-type context, on the other. Despite a rough correspondence in 
size of the target population, there remain differences as to the intensiveness of con­
nections between the group members, the span of control, and the type of the problems 
to be solved (construction versus improvement problems).
It’s quite remarkable that there are hardly any links between research and method­
ology in an N-type and n-type context, i.e. policy research and organisational research. 
Methodologists and researchers in these domains both make use of their own jargon, 
and have their proper frame of reference. This may be another consequence of the fact 
that researchers in both domains are very much-oriented at m aterial theories. As pointed 
out in section 1 of course policy theories and management theories are quite different 
from each other. However, there are three reasons why research methodologists should 
not treat the research within these two contexts separately, despite the differences that 
were made in this section. The first is tha t both types of research have much in common 
with regard to the type of problem to be addressed, the research methodology to be used 
and the criteria to be met, i.e. an implementary and ethical validity. The second reason 
is tha t there is an ongoing privatizing of public life. Many organizations tha t formerly 
belonged to the public domain become private organizations. Apart from this there are 
many situations where the differences between the two domains become vague. Third, 
researchers and methodologists in both domains can learn from each other, as a con­
sequence of the fact tha t in the past they independently from each other developed 
insights. These insights should be reconciled by future research methodologists as 
much as possible.
4 . G E N E R I C  M O D E L S  E O R  P R O B L E M  S O L V I N G
Practice-oriented research focuses on resolving one or the other practical problem, i.e. 
a policy problem or an issue of strategic management. There are two types of these prob­
lems: im provem ent problems and construction  problems. The first are about an existing 
situation or development, where by means of a problem analysis and a diagnosis a 
problem is observed. Then by carrying out an intervention the problem solving team or 
agency tries to improve the problematic state of affairs. In a construction problem, 
however, the idea rises that something new can be created, rather than that an existing
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object, situation or process can be improved. For a new creation I will use here the term 
artefact, which may be material or immaterial in nature.
The difference between improvement problems and construction problems also has 
something to do with the attitude of the problem owner. This can be explained by means 
of the distinction tha t Ackoff made between inac tiv ism  and in teractivism  (Ackoff 1974). 
According to Ackoff, inactivists have ‘a greater fear o f  n o t doing som eth ing th a t should be 
done (errors o f  com m ission) than o f  n o t doing som eth ing th a t should be done (error o f  om is­
s io n ). Hence the la tter tend to  react m a in ly  to serious threats, rather than to opportun ities'. 
That is, in terms of our distinction they are mainly involved with improvement problems. 
In contrast, interactivists are characterized by Ackoff as people ‘w ho w a n t to design a 
desirable fu ture and inven t w ays to  bring i t  a b o u t . ... They tr y  to preven t, n o t m erely prepare  
for, threats and to create, no t merely exploit, opportunities' (Ackoff 1974). In our terminology, 
they are the owners of construction problems.
Despite the differences mentioned above, the distinction between improving an 
existing situation on the one hand, and creating a new one on the other, is gradual 
rather than fundamental. Each improvement has something new and each renewal con­
tinues aspects or parts of the old. For instance, how new is a new type of cargo plane? 
Doubtless it has many traits and particles in common with existing types of aircrafts. 
I propose to distinguish three gradations of renewal. (I) A new material or immaterial 
artefact, of which no variants did exist before, such as the electric motor or nuclear 
electricity. (II) A radical change of an existing artefact, such as the invention of the 
helicopter in the middle of the last century. The renewal was the replacement of aero­
foil wings by rotating ones. In business organizations this is the well-known domain of 
product renewal. (Ill) A smooth change, which in fact means improving an existing 
material or immaterial object, situation or process, such as the (material or immaterial) 
products of profit or not-for-profit organizations. The only difference with an improve­
m ent problem is that there is no bad functioning of an existing object, situation or 
process. Instead there is simply the idea that something new can be produced. This does 
not detract from the fact that the logic of addressing a construction problem can be 
used in developing a plan for an intervention as part of the resolution of an improve­
m ent problem (see the arrow in Figure 4 ). Correspondingly to the differences above
I will distinguish three types of construction problems: type I, type II and type III.
The problems to be addressed in an n-type context are often of the construction 
type I or II, whereas in an N-type context the problems at hand are mostly improvement 
problems. Van de Vail too seems to make this difference between improvement problems 
and construction problems, where he writes (my translation from the Dutch; PV): ‘N o t  
surprisingly, social policy research is seldom  oriented tow ards a to ta l overthrow  o f  the political 
or social structure. O n the contrary, m o st projects in social policy  research are designed to 
encourage concrete social change w ith in  the param eters o f  the current social system ' (Van de 
Vail, 1980: 38).
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To address a problem in a systematic and proper way we need to follow a generic process 
model. There are two such models: one for addressing improvement problems and one 
for construction problems, i.e. the intervention  and the design cycle, respectively (see Fig­
ure 4). They will be only briefly described below, as they are extensively described in lit­
erature. See for the intervention (or policy) cycle the literature on policy research on 
page 12 . For the design cycle see Verschuren and Hartog 2005, and Verschuren 2008 and
2009 . The relevance for our research question in the introduction of this essay is that 
for answering it we need to think about the role of methodology in each stage of these 
models. This is what will be done in section 5.
Intervention cycle Design cycle
1. problem  analysis
2. d iagnosis
3. conditions fo r a solution
first hunch/design goal 
/  design  dem ands/assum ptions 
i structural specifications 
| construction o f  prototype 
\  im plem entation o f  prototype 
evaluation
5. execution o f  the plan
6. evaluation
Figure 4. The intervention and design cycles used to address improvement problems and construction problems
The in terven tion  cycle
1 . Problem analysis: First of all, the question must be answered what exactly is the problem, 
why it is a problem and whose problem it is, the so-called W-questions. The what-question 
relates to the facts and phenomena tha t are experienced as problematic. I call this the 
F side of the problem (Facts). These facts m ust be described in a valid way, in principle 
by means of scientific research. The why-question mostly involves two sub questions:
(a) How does an alternative object, situation or process look like that is either desired 
or preferred, or to be avoided? I will call this the D-side of the problem (Desire), (b) 
W hat are the negative consequences or effects of the actual state of affairs (facts)? 
Here we have to make a balance between positive and negative consequences or effects. 
The who-question, finally, may refer to three possibilities: the individual or the depart­
ment that caused the problem, the one that suffers from the consequences or the person 
or department that is held to resolve the problem. Instead of a problem analysis, people 
very often start straight away with a diagnosis or even a plan for solution of the problem 
at hand. Thus it remains unclear what the problem exactly is, why it is (called) a prob­
lem and whose problem it is, with bad results of problem solving as a consequence.
2 . D iagnosis: Once the problem is clear in the above sense, the question is what are the 
backgrounds and causes that are responsible for the problem to be solved. Usually there 
is a chain or even a network of causes. These can be represented by a causal model, also
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called a diagnostic model (see Verschuren 2008). In most cases the solution to a problem 
consists of tackling one or more of the exogenous or intervening variables in this model. 
In order to know which variable(s) best can be tackled the researcher can make use of 
prescriptive theories. These theories tell him or her, what an optimal or ideal state of 
affairs would be, given certain assumptions and circumstances. For more information 
the reader is referred to Verschuren 2008.
3 . C onditions fo r  solution: Which conditions m ust be fulfilled with the solution to be 
chosen? There may be four sources of conditions that must be checked by the researcher:
(a) the agreement of the target population with the plan for a solution, (b) The problem 
solvers, i.e. the policy makers in an N-type context or the managers in an n-type con­
text, who have to carry out the plan. Involved are the available time, money, knowledge, 
experience, attitudes and skills of these people, (c) Existing strategic management or 
public policy. Usually the plan for an intervention m ust fit long-term policy or strategic 
management, (d) The social or political environment (N-type context) or the institu­
tional and transactional environment (n-type context). In the first case there may be 
all kinds of rules and laws relating to the problem at hand and its solution. In the second 
case conditions like cultural norms and (gentlemen’s) agreements may play a role. All 
these conditions and restrictions narrow down the degrees of freedom of the designer 
who wants to build a strategic management or a public policy in stage 4 of the interven­
tion cycle.
4 . Plan fo r an in tervention: Then a plan for tackling the problem to be solved needs to be 
developed. This plan has three generic components: (a) the intervention needed for 
bringing about a change in one or more of the causes of the problem at hand, (b) an 
impact model that links the intervention with the problem at hand, and (c) a strategic 
management or a policy that says what the people who are concerned actually m ust do. 
More specifically, the intervention is needed for inducing a shift in one or more of the 
causes of the problem at hand. The impact model is a transformation of the diagnostic 
model in step 2 , where the causal relations of the type ‘X causes Y’ in the causal or diag­
nostic model, are transformed in prescriptive relations of the type ‘X m ust be affected 
in order to bring about a change in Y’. Here Y stands for the problem at hand. See for 
more information about prescription and impact models Verschuren 2000 , 2008 and 
2009, chapter 6. Thirdly, in most cases it is necessary to describe a set of tasks that must 
be fulfilled for making run the intervention and the impact model in a proper way. This 
is called a policy (public administration) or a strategic m anagement (business administra­
tion).
5 . Execution o f  the plan: Most of the times we want to know whether the plan is carried 
out properly, with the right efforts of the people involved, and with adequate use of the 
right means. The activities to achieve this are called m onitorin g . For an adequate 
monitoring we need a so-called information system, consisting of a database prepared 
for continuously adding new data concerning the execution of the plan. This makes a
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process evaluation at any time possible, on the basis of which the intervention can be 
adjusted immediately when it’s needed.
6. Evaluation: After the intervention has taken place, we need to find out whether an 
improvement has taken place, an instance of ex p o st product evaluation. For this it is 
needed to compare an ex ante and an ex post measurement of the target variable(s), i.e. 
the problem to be solved. If the difference between the two is nil or insufficient, indi­
cating tha t progress is unsatisfactory, then further action is needed in a second run of 
the intervention cycle. There are two ways to find out what is or went wrong in the first 
run of the intervention cycle, which complement each other very well: (a) a plan  evalu­
ation and (b) a process evaluation of the way the intervention is carried out. Often an 
ex post process evaluation is the best to start with. Here we can make use of the infor­
mation system tha t was made in the context of monitoring (stage 5), completed with 
data tha t are gathered after the intervention is finished. Some im portant issues here are 
a check of the validity of the impact model, as well as of the efforts of those who carried 
out the intervention. Finally it is possible that already something in the plan of the 
intervention is responsible for a bad result. Here we need to check at face value the 
feasibility of the intervention goal, as well as the utility of the chosen means for achieving 
this goal.
The design cycle
1 . First hunch/design goal: The design cycle starts with an initial impetus to create a new 
material or immaterial artefact. It may be based on the idea of somebody or a team of 
experts from different disciplines, that the artefact is possible given newly developed 
knowledge, hardware and/ or software that may serve for building, or that may function 
as modules and half-fabricates, of the artefact to be. Next, one of the very first tasks to 
steer the process of designing is to formulate a provisional goal that the functioning of 
the artefact or the use of it must fulfil. Later this goal maybe adapted, if new perspectives 
arise or if the artefact gets another shape than was decided at the start of the process. 
This makes part of the highly iterative character of a designing process (see for details 
of an iterative strategy Verschuren 2009, chapter 4 ).
2 . Design demands /  assum ptions: The next step is to make sure what demands the artefact 
m ust fulfil and which qualifications future users should have (assumptions), in order 
to assure an adequate functioning and use of the artefact. There are three variants of 
design demands: fun ction a l, users and contextual demands. The functional demands 
relate to the functions tha t (the use of) the artefact must fulfil in order to achieve or to 
bring closer the design goal. The users’ demands relate to the demands of the future 
users of the artefact, for instance, those related to the ease and costs of operation. Con­
textual demands relate to all kinds of claims stemming from the social, political and 
physical environment where the artefact will be installed or used.
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Conversely, it must be possible for the designer to take design assumptions as a starting 
point and guideline for designing. These relate to criteria that the future users and context 
need to meet, i.e. the users assumptions and contextual assumptions. User’s assump­
tions relate to both physical and mental characteristics of the future users. Relevant 
physical aspects may be sizes of limbs, qualities of sight and hearing, and the motor 
system of the people at hand. Contextual assumptions may relate to issues such like the 
presence and availability of all kinds of relevant infra-structural means and condi­
tions.
3 . Structural specifications: These relate to the pieces and characteristics that the artefact 
must have in order to fulfil the design demands on the one hand, and to make the design 
assumptions realistic on the other. They m ust be logically derived from the design de­
mands and the design assumptions. Here the designer should make sure that often the 
same demands can be fulfilled by different functionally equivalent objects or processes. 
Conversely, the same object may have to meet different design demands and assump­
tions. This offers degrees of freedom for the designer, which maybe of use in making all 
structural specifications to a balanced and integrated whole. Together the design demands, 
design assumptions and structural specifications constitute the design on paper, ready 
to be realized in a prototype of the artefact in the next step.
4 . Construction o f  a prototype: The next step is to materialize (material artefact) or realize 
(immaterial artefact) the structural specifications into a prototype, taking into account 
the design goal, the design demands and the design assumptions. In particular, when this 
costs a long time and/or much money, it may be advantageous to make a first reduced 
and provisional model of the artefact, the so-called mock up. Here the only aim is the 
functioning of the artefact to be. No effort is being made as to secondary issues such as 
sustainability and aesthetics. One of the tasks of the designer or the design team is to 
take care tha t all pieces and aspects of the mock up or prototype constitute an inte­
grated and balanced whole. It’s strongly recommended to act in this stage following the 
strategy of an explorative experiment (see section 5, as well as Verschuren 2009 and
2010 (forthcoming)). Instead of first assembling the whole prototype and then to test 
it, the designer or the designing team continuously tests the several aspects and particles 
of the prototype to be on an experimental basis.
5 . Im plem entation o f  the prototype: The prototype can be tested in either a real-life situa­
tion or in an explorative experiment. By means of formative evaluation research the 
designer or the designing team explores the effectiveness of the prototype, with the 
design demands and design assumptions as criteria. The evaluation has an iterative 
character, as the design demands and assumptions, and/or the structural specifica­
tions, may change at this stage as a consequence of an iterative approach. As already 
stated, in order to make an iterative procedure easier and cheaper, the designers can 
make use of a mock up version of a prototype. In case of a material artefact the mock 
up may also have the form of a scale model. The result is a definitive prototype, ready for
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use and or for production if the artefact is to be reproduced. A by-product of this stage 
may be instructions for implementing the artefact and a first concept of a manual for 
the users.
6. Evaluation o f  the perform ances: Finally, after the artefact has been installed or used for 
a while, there is a summative evaluation in order to know whether the artefact behaves 
properly in the long run and whether it contributes to achieving or bringing closer the 
design goal that was set at the start. In case this evaluation points out that the artefact 
does not function well, a formative evaluation is needed in order to find out why this is 
the case. This type of evaluation requires an evaluation of the designing process in the 
stages l to 5 (see also stage 6 of the intervention cycle). For more information about the 
series of the design cycle see Verschuren and Hartog 2005, and Verschuren 2008 and 
2009 .
5 . IS P R A C T I C E - O R I E N T E D  R E S E A R C H  D I F F E R E N T  ?
In this section it will be argued tha t the shift in the context of discovery, i.e. the rise of 
practice-oriented research, m ust be followed, amongst others, by a shift in the context 
of justification. This will be done by means of confrontation of methodological de­
mands from section 2 , three main types of research from section 3, and stages in both 
the intervention and design cycle from section 4 on the one hand, with research strate­
gies to be presented below on the other (see the arrows a, b, c. d and e in Figure 1 ). These 
confrontations will make clear: (1 ) to what extent existing research strategies can meet 
the demands (arrow a); (2 ) what in their turn  the importance of the latter is for the 
N-type and n-type of practice-oriented research, compared to (a) theory-oriented re­
search and (b) each other (arrow b); (3) what the importance is of the research strate­
gies for the three main types of research (arrow c), as well as for the separate stages of 
the intervention and the design cycle (arrow d); and finally (4 ) to what extent the three 
main types of research (should) make use of both cycles (arrow e).
Research strategies
Below first seven research strategies are shortly characterized as they are to be found in 
literature on research methodology, or are to be defined below. For more information 
about these strategies the reader is referred to Verschuren 2009 and 2010 (forthcoming). 
Correlational research: This is a quantitative type of research, also called large-scale survey. 
It is normally based on a relatively large random sample with n = approximately 80 to 
10.000 elements or more, taken from a still much larger population. Given the large size, 
labour-extensive methods are needed, such as a written questionnaire, standardized 
tests and quantitative content analysis. It has its name because the calculation of cor­
relations between variables is one of the first and most im portant operations tha t the 
researcher makes. They are the inputfor all kinds of multivariate analyses, such as scaling 
techniques, regression analysis, factor analysis and analysis of variance ( a n o v a ) .
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Testing-experiment: This by far is the most powerful strategy for testing causal hypotheses 
of the form: X has an effect on Y. Two groups (or more), one with a treatm ent X (the 
cause) and the other w ithout X or with a neutral treatment, are compared as to a 
dependent variable Y. If there is a difference as to the Y scores in both groups, then 
under a set of assumptions as to the absence of biases, it may be concluded th a t X 
has an effect on Y. Usually the groups are formed by means of random assignment 
(randomized experiment), and they are under full control of the researcher in order to 
make the assumptions realistic (laboratory experiment).
Q -typ e  o f  qualita tive  research: This is a research strategy using a low number of research 
units (n = i to 40 roughly). Qualitative labour-intensive methods of data gathering 
(open interview, observation) and of data analysis (confrontation, interpretation and 
coding) are used. It starts from an empirical rather than a theoretical basis, as is the 
case in mainstream research. Hence alternative names are em piry-driven  research and 
inductive  research. This primarily aims at internal validity and profoundness, rather 
than at external validity and width as is the case in a correlational design. The best 
known example of this class of research strategies is the grounded theory approach 
taken by Glaser and Strauss.
q-type o f  qualitative research: This class of research strategies is comparable to the Q-type, 
except the inductive and empiry-driven character. It resembles quantitative research in 
tha t it follows the same deductive type of reasoning, a th eo ry -driven approach and the 
empirical cycle. It differs from quantitative research and it shares with the Q-type the 
use of qualitative methods for generating and analyzing the research material. W orth 
mentioning here are open forms of interviewing, observation and content analysis of 
textual and audio-visual media and documents. The most well-known variant of this 
strategy is the comparative case study (see Verschuren 2003).
E xplorative experim ent: This is small-scale research with n = approximately 1 to 20 , 
designed to follow an individual, a group or an artefact X through time, under strictly 
controlled circumstances. In principle it uses labour-intensive qualitative methods for 
observation and data gathering. In contrast to the testing experiment, in an explorative 
experiment (in principle) only one single research group is used. Its strength is the 
manipulation and control of the object of research by the researcher, as well as measure­
m ent under fully controlled circumstances. Besides developing the prototype for an 
artefact, this strategy may be used to open the black box of a causal mechanism (X -»Y) 
tha t is found in a testing experiment (see Verschuren 2010 (forthcoming)). 
Knowledge-based research: Two remaining research strategies I would like to identify as 
hum an resource-based strategies: knowledge-based and reflective research. The strate­
gies mentioned above are all data-based, i.e. data are the input for analysis. In contrast, 
the inputs for hum an resource-based research are capacities of the hum an mind. In 
knowledge-based research the input is knowledge tha t exists in literature or in the 
heads of experts. By means of confrontation and analysis of these insights the researcher
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tries to produce new knowledge. Examples are literature research, Delphi research, 
group model building and focus groups with experts.
Reflective research: Here, instead of data or existing knowledge, the m ental capacity or 
brain pow er of the researcher is the basis. Although these matters of course play a role 
in any research, here they are cultivated as the only or the main basis for producing new 
knowledge and insights. Mental techniques that can be used are logical reasoning (deduc­
tion, induction, and abduction), in trospection  and em pathy  of the researcher, confronta­
tion  of ideas and objects, and the m ental experim ent. Confrontation is the comparison 
of two ideas or entities, asking what the implications are of the one for the other or for 
an external object (see Verschuren 2008). In all these cases the researcher him or her 
self is an instrum ent for both ‘observation’ and analysis.
Strategies, dem ands and types o f  research 
The next question that needs to be answered is how these research strategies behave in 
front of the methodological criteria and demands in section 2 . This question requires a 
confrontation as is symbolized in arrow a in Figure 1 on page 10 . 1 answer this question 
by giving qualifications to the research strategies for each of the criteria and issues in 
Figure 2 . The results are represented in Figure 5 below. The qualifications in this figure, 
although determined at face value, are firmly based on methodological arguments. The 
interested reader is referred to Verschuren 2009 for an overview of these arguments. 
Regarding the qualities of hum an resource-based strategies as yet there is relatively little 
experience and there has been done little methodological research. This explains why 
some cells are left open.
Figure 5 is divided into quadrants. On the one hand they are based on the division 
of the demands in internal and external scientific criteria and issues (see section 2 ). 
Roughly they relate to an epistemological and an implementary validity, respectively. 
On the other hand the research strategies are divided into quantitative strategies on 
one side, and qualitative and hum an resource-based strategies on the other. Figure 5 
makes clear that the higher scores are found in the quadrants I and IV. It means tha t the 
quantitative strategies behave better as to the epistemological criteria, whereas the 
qualitative and human resource-based strategies perform better relating to the implemen­
tary criteria. This pattern is only broken by the high scores of the qualitative strategies 
for internal validity in quadrant II. The reason for these high scores is to a large extent 
to be found in the labour-intensive characteristic of these strategies. This makes possible 
a thorough generation of empirical material needed, as well as addressing problems 
such as social desirability, strategic answers and reactive behaviour of respondents. 
W ithin the qualitative strategies the q-type does slightly better than the Q-type. And 
the class of qualitative strategies has a slightly higher score than the hum an resource- 
based strategies.






corr. t-exp. q-type Q-type e-exp.
1 internal validity + - ++ ++ ++ ++
2 external validity ++ - - - -
3 verifiability ++ ++ + - - + - - -
4  cum ulativity ++ ++ 1 II + - - - -
5 variability - III IV + - + ++ + +
6 new phenomenon - + + - + ++ ++ + -
7 (group)processes - - + + + - -
8 interconnectedness - - + + + - + - + -
9 small target population - + - ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
locom prehensib ility - + - ++ ++ ++ - +
11 acceptability - + - ++ ++ + - - +
12 legitim acy - + - ++ + + - + - -
13 res. as a learning proc. - - + - + + - -
i4holism - - ++ + + ++ +
15 interdisciplinarity - - - - - ++ -
i6 co n text restraint + - - ++ ++ ++ + - -
17  profoundness - - ++ ++ ++ + - -
Figure 5. The extent to which research strategies meet methodological criteria and demands: - = does not meet,
++ = meets very well
The next question tha t needs to be answered is how im portant the demands are for the 
three main types of research, i.e. for theory-oriented, and the N-type and n-type of 
practice-oriented research (arrow b in Figure 1 ). To answer this question the scores in 
Figure 6 were produced, again at face value. For an explanation of these scores see Ver­
schuren 2009; chapter 1 1 . This Figure too is divided into four quadrants. Just as in Fig­
ure 5 the methodological demands are divided into the categories of internal and exter­
nal scientific demands. And for the types of research the dividing line is drawn between 
theory-oriented research on the one hand, and the two types of practice-oriented re­
search on the other. Again the highest scores are found in the quadrants I and IV. It tells 
us that the internal scientific or epistemological demands are the most important for 
theory-oriented research, whereas the external scientific or implementary demands are 
the most im portant for practice-oriented research. This, however, with the remark that 
this counts more for the n-type than it does for the N-type of practice-oriented re­
search. From this it can be concluded that the biggest difference at this point is between 
theory-oriented research and the n-type of practice-oriented research, with the N-type
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Types o f scientific research
theory- practice-oriented
M ethodological demands oriented N-type n-type
1 internal validity ++ ++ ++
2 external validity ++ + -
3 verifiability ++ ++ + -
4  cum ulativity ++ 1 II + - + -
5 variability + - III IV + ++
6 new phenomenon + - + ++
7 (group)processes + - + ++
8 interconnectedness - + - ++
9 small target population - - ++
10  com prehensibility - + - ++
11 acceptability - + - ++
12 legitim acy - + - ++
13 res. as a learning proc. - - ++
14  holism - + - ++
15 interdisciplinarity - + ++
16 context restraint - + - ++
17 profoundness + - + ++
Figure 6. Importance o f methodological 
demands for types o f research: - = unimpor­
tant, ++ = very important
in between. Moreover, the scores in quadrant II are only slightly lower than those in 
quadrant I, telling tha t the epistemological criteria are only slightly less im portant for 
practice-oriented than they are for theory-oriented research. As quadrant III shows and 
in accordance with common sense, the implementary demands appear to have hardly 
any relevance for theory-oriented research.
Above we confronted research strategies and three main types of research with 
methodological demands. This makes possible logical conclusions about the confron­
tation of the main types with the research strategies. From Figure 6 we know tha t the 
epistemological criteria are the most im portant for theory-oriented research, whereas 
the implementary criteria are by far the most relevant for practice-oriented research. 
Moreover, Figure 5 makes clear that quantitative strategies best fit the epistemological 
demands, whereas qualitative and human resource-based strategies can cope best with 
the implementary demands. From this it follows tha t the quantitative strategies are 
most im portant for mainstream theory-oriented research, whereas the qualitative and 
human resource-based strategies are most important for the n-type of practice-oriented 
research, with the N-type of practice-oriented research in between. In Figure 7 we see 
scores for the seven research strategies separately. In the last column I have added at










correlational research ++ + + - ++
testin g experim ent + + - + + -
qualitative
research
Q -type qualitative research ++
q-type qualitative research + - + - ++ + -
explorative experim ent + - + ++
human resource-based research know ledge based research + - + ++
reflective research + - + - + + -
Figure 7. Utility and intensity o f use o f research strategies for theory-oriented and two types o f practice-oriented 
research in the social, policy and management sciences. - = not useful / not used, ++ = very useful / very much used
face value scores for the frequency of use in research practice in the social, policy and 
management sciences. Looking at the first three columns we see confirmation of our 
conclusion above that theory-oriented and practice-oriented research are opposites, 
with the N-type of practice-oriented research somewhere in between. That is, the first 
two types are methodologically most different, whereas the N-type of practice-oriented 
research has some commonalities with theory-oriented research. The reason for the 
latter may be the large-scale of the target population in both cases, in combination 
with an emphasis on the external validity of research results tha t is strived for. And as 
we know from section 2 there are quite a few characteristics that are associated with the 
size of the target population.
Comparing the rows in Figure 7 to each other we can draw conclusions as to sepa­
rate research strategies, relating to both the utility for the three main types of research 
and the question as to whether they are over or under-exploited. The utility of the cor­
relational design is highest for theory-oriented research and weakest for the n-type of 
practice-oriented research, with the N-type in between. Given the fact that it is the 
most used design in the social, policy and management sciences, we can say tha t there 
is a right exploitation of it as to theory-oriented research; utility and actual use are in 
balance. However, seen from the perspective of the n-type of practice-oriented research 
there is an over-exploitation of this research strategy.
As to the testing experiment in row 2 of Figure 7, this strategy is useful for the 
n-type of practice-oriented and for theory-oriented research. It seems to be second best 
for the N-type of practice-oriented research. As this design is not used very much in the 
practice of social, policy and management science research, this is an instance of under­
exploitation of the n-type research.
Having been developed just for theory building, the Q-type of qualitative research 
has most relevance for theory-oriented research. As it is little used in practice we can
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qualify this as a case of under-exploitation in the domain of theory-oriented research. 
Quite different is the position of the q-type. This appears to be most relevant for the 
n-type of practice-oriented research, and only moderately relevant for the other two. As 
this strategy is relatively little used in practice, this means tha t it is under-exploited in 
the n-type of research. A great deal can be gained by using this strategy more often in 
organizational research.
Roughly the same goes for the explorative experiment. It’s most relevant for the 
n-type research. For instance, it is an excellent means to test the prototype of an artefact 
(see below). But it can also be used for formative evaluation of a new policy in an N- 
type context. This strategy may also have some relevance for theory-oriented research. 
More specifically it can be exploited for studying causal mechanisms. That is, once a 
causal effect of X on Y has been proven by means of a testing experiment, the explora­
tive experiment may be used to open the black box of this causal mechanism. It thus 
acts as a remedy against the limitations of the black box character of the class of testing 
experiments. As the explorative experiment is hardly known in the social sciences, this 
is an instance of overall under-exploitation.
Roughly the same goes for the two human resource-based strategies. The knowledge- 
based research is most useful for the n-type practice-oriented research, and a little less 
for the N-type. As it in practice is little used this again indicates under-exploitation. 
The score pattern for reflective research looks like the one of knowledge-based research, 
albeit that overall the scores of the first are slightly lower. The reason for this may be 
that the trustworthiness of the results may be a little lower. The results of a knowledge- 
based research are the product of a team of interacting experts. In contrast, reflective 
research in principle is based on the input of the researcher only, which gives fewer 
guarantees as to the reliability of the results. It seems to be under-exploited in the n-type 
of research.
Strategies, in terven tion  /  design cycle, and types o f  research 
The next issue to be elaborated in this section about reallocation of research strategies 
is what specifications of the above conclusions are needed when we look at improvement 
and construction problems separately (arrow d in Figure 1 ). I also will briefly evaluate 
the use that the N-type and n-type of practice-oriented research make of the interven­
tion and design cycle (arrow e). To answer the first question, stages of the intervention 
cycle and the design cycle were confronted with the research strategies. The results of 
this confrontation are the scores in Figure 8. For an explanation of these scores the 
reader is again referred to Verschuren 2009, chapter 11 . There are two ways to interpret 
and evaluate the score patterns: (a) To compare the columns within the intervention 
cycle and the design cycle separately. This will give an idea of the relative utility of re­
search strategies for resolving improvement and construction problems, respectively, 
(b) Comparison of columns in the one cycle with the corresponding columns in the
42 P R O F .  P I E T  J . M .  V E R S C H U R E N
other cycle. This will give insight in the differences in the utility of research strategies 
for resolving improvement problems and construction problems, respectively. 
Com parison (a ):  A remarkable feature of the upper half of Figure 8 is the weak position of 
the Q-type of qualitative research. This stands to reason, as this strategy was developed 
for theory construction. One of the most salient deficiencies of this strategy for solving 
practical problems is the lack by definition of a clear research issue at the beginning of 
the research project. In contrast, of all seven strategies the q-type appears to be the most 
useful for resolving improvement problems. Second best in this respect are the explorative 
experiment, the correlational research and knowledge-based research. The latter may 
be of particular use in developing a plan for an intervention. It may also be exploited for 
an analysis of the problem to be solved. Of relatively little use for addressing improve­
m ent problems are, besides the Q-type, the testing experiment and reflective research.
In the bottom part of Figure 8 we see that by far the most useful strategy in address­
ing construction problems is knowledge-based research. In particular, in the stages (l) 
first hunch, (3) defining structural specifications, and (4 ) developing a prototype, this 
strategy can play an im portant role. Besides, both the q-type of qualitative research and 
reflective research offer good perspectives here. Another remarkable conclusion is that 
empirical or data-based research strategies are of little use here (see the first five columns). 
This is in accordance with the fact tha t construction problems are about the creation of 
a new reality, rather than improving an existing one. Exceptions relate to the stages 2b, 
5 and 6. In stage 2b we need empirical research for registration of the design assump­
tions. And in the stages 5 and 6 we need empirical data for a formative and summative 
evaluation of the prototype and the artefact, respectively. This relatively weak position 
of empirical research goes hand in hand with a strong position of the hum an resource- 
based strategies. The reason is that logical analysis, deductive reasoning, as well as crea­
tivity are im portant ingredients here (see section 4 ).
Com parison ( b ) : Comparing the first five columns in the upper and bottom half of Figure 
8 shows, in accordance with the last conclusion above, tha t empirical research plays a 
much more im portant role in addressing improvement problems than it does for con­
struction problems. The reason was given above. Conversely hum an resource-based 
strategies play a much more im portant role for construction problems than they do for 
improvement problems. An explanation again was given above. Another remarkable 
feature is tha t the q-type of qualitative research does a good job in both cycles. This is in 
accordance with an earlier conclusion tha t this type of research is very useful for prac- 
tice-oriented research in general. The same goes, although slightly less, for the human 
resource-based strategies. In particular, knowledge-based research appears to be very 
useful for both cycles.
The final question tha t needs to be answered in this section is whether in practice- 
oriented research thus far is made an adequate use of the intervention cycle and the 
design cycle (see arrow e in Figure 1 ). The result of this confrontation is presented in
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Intervention cycle correi. t-exper. q-type Q-type e-exper. kn. bas. refi. res.
1 problem  analysis + - + + - + + -
2 diagnosis + + + + + - + -
3 conditions fo r solution + ++ + - + - + -
4  plan fo r intervention + - + + + + +
5 execution  o f  the plan + ++ + - ++ + -
6 evaluation + ++ + + + -
Design cycle
1 first hunch/design goal + + - ++ + -
2a design  dem ands + - + + + +
2b design  assum ptions + - + + + - + + - +
3 structural specifications ++ +
4  prototype ++ +
5 im plem entation + + ++ + -
6 evaluation + ++ + + + -
Figure 8. Utility o f research strategies for different stages o f the intervention cycle and the design cycle for solving 
improvement problems and construction problems
Type o f research
Intervention cycle Design cycle
importance actual use im portance actual use
theory oriented
N -type practice oriented ++ ++ + -
n-type practice oriented + ++ + -
Figure 9. Importance and actual use o f the intervention cycle and design cycle in theory-oriented, and the N- and 
n-type o f practice-oriented research. - = not im portant / not used, ++ = very im portant / very much used
Figure 9. At face value and based on logical and methodological considerations, scores 
were given for the importance of the two cycles for the three main types of research. 
Besides, at face value estimated scores were given to the actual frequency of use of these 
cycles. As Figure 9 shows and corresponding to common sense, the cycles are of no 
importance to the theory-oriented research, for the simple reason tha t there is no 
practical problem to be solved. Correspondingly there is neither any actual use of these 
cycles in this domain of mainstream research in the social, policy and management 
sciences.
In policy research (N-type) the intervention cycle, also called the policy cycle, 
appears to be very important. And it rightly is much used here. However, despite the
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frequent use of the intervention cycle in public policy, there is some criticism as to 
developing research methodology in this domain. As Figure 4 shows the intervention 
cycle has six stages, of which the last is evaluation. The remarkable thing is that research 
for exclusive support of this last stage, i.e. evaluation research, is very well methodo­
logically developed. A huge am ount of books and articles are found in this domain (see, 
for instance, Algemene Rekenkamer 2002 , Furubu et al 2002 , House 1993, Mohr 1995, 
Owen 1999, Patton 1997, Pawson and Tilley 1997, Rossi et al 1998, Shadish et al 1995). 
But for the other five stages there hardly anything is to be found in methodological litera­
ture. For tha t reason as yet, much to its detrimental, real policy research (as contrasted 
to policy analysis; see section 2 ) to a large extent coincides with evaluation research.
In contrast, the design cycle is of less use for policy research, as it aims at radical 
changes. As is pointed out in section 2 radical changes in principle are to be avoided in 
this N-type context. So, in practice the design cycle is rightly little used here.
As to organizational research (n-type) there is very little use of both generic models 
for problem solving as a starting point and guidance for the researcher (let alone for the 
research methodologist). Neither there is much usage of or reference to the vast litera­
ture on evaluation research here. All of this is detrimental to organizational research.
6 .  B L A N K  S P O T S  I N  R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y
Two questions may be asked after the analyses thus far: (a) why there was and is still 
so little attention for implementary validity in research and research methodology?
(b) Does an implementary validity besides epistemological validity cover all of the 
responsibility of a practice-oriented researcher? The first question will be answered 
below. Answering the second is postponed to the next section. A first and basic answer 
to the first question can be found in a broader development in science, i.e. neglect and 
even banishm ent of values from science. This is part of the positivistic tradition in 
science, with its doctrine of non-normative. In this section I describe how this doctrine 
led to a predominance of the context of justification and a disregard for the context of 
discovery. Besides, the introduction of a context of implementation is advocated. I will 
take Figure 10 as a guide line, with its overview of the contexts of discovery, justification 
and im plem entation , as well as a number of directly related issues. It shows the connec­
tions of these contexts with the design of research and with the different forms of 
validity as to be met in several parts of the research design. Moreover it shows which 
deficiencies an over-emphasis on the context of justification may, and actually does 
cause, as will be argued below.
Predominance o f  the context o f  justification  
In answering the question what the value is of scientific research, there are at least two 
sub questions to be addressed: Are we researching (a) the righ t thing, and are we doing 
tha t (b) in the righ t w ay?  The first sub question lays in the context of discovery and the
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second relates to the context of justification . Although this distinction is very well 
known in traditional research methodology, the context of discovery is a blank spot. 
The same goes for a third newly to distinguishing type of context, the context of imple­
mentation (see column I of Figure 10 ). Its necessity will be argued below.
As columns II and III of Figure 10 show, the three contexts are closely linked to 
three parts of the design of a practice-oriented research: the conceptual, the technical 
and the im plem entation  design, respectively, (a) The conceptual design gives an answer 
to the question what is the object of research. It’s divided into the practical problem to 
be solved and, derived from this, the knowledge problem. The latter relates to the research 
question(s) and their link to existing theory. It is true tha t in a conceptual design the 
researcher has to recognize the context of justification, in so far that it m ust be feasible 
to carry it out. And designing it in a methodologically adequate way too is a matter of 
justification; the snake swallows its own tail (see for these arguments Verschuren 2009, 
chapters 6 and 7 ). But by far in main part making a conceptual design for a research is 
in the context of discovery, (b) The technical design tells us how  the research will be 
carried out, divided into the stages of generating the research material (data-gathering) 
and the analysis of this material (data analysis). These activities relate to the context of 
ju stifica tio n , (c) The implementation design involves advices as to the usage of the 
produced knowledge, the process of problem solving, the fit to local conditions and a 
formative evaluation of the intervention or artefact. The first two sub-designs (a) and
(b) are known from literature (see Verschuren 2007 and 2009). The implementation 
design and context of implementation are new, and are proposed below as im portant 
supplements to the methodology of practice-oriented research.
In column IV of Figure 10 are indicated those domains in research methodology 
that primarily spent time and energy to (someof) the above-mentioned areas. Over the 
last half century by far most methodology has been developed by qualitative and espe­
cially quantitative researchers and research methodologists. However, almost all their 
methodological publications are in the context of justification, and thus exclusively 
relate to the technical design of research. Nevertheless, some effort was and is still being 
spent on the context of discovery. Under the heading of problem structuring quite a bit 
of work has been done by participatory researchers and methodologists as to that part 
of the conceptual design tha t relates to the practical problem that needs to be solved. 
See Hindle and Franco 2009, Franco 2008, Franco and Meadows 2007, Mingers and 
Rosenhead 2004, Rosenhead and Mingers 2002 , Keys 2006, Weber and Khademian 
2008, W inter 2006 . But this is only a minor part of the total investment in research 
methodology in the social, policy and management sciences. In sum this means that 
little effort was spent by methodologists to subjects such as the choice of the object of 
research, methods for the analysis of the problem to be solved, i.e. problem analysis, 
ways of theory building and, last but not least, selection and formulation of research 
questions and hypotheses.
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1 II III IV V
Context of... Relates to... Main com ponents Gets attention of... Criteria to  be used
Discovery conceptual
design
- choice o f  problem

















validity- analysis o f  the 
research m aterial
qu antitative research 
m ethodologists
Implementation im plem entation
design
- use o f  know ledge
- problem  solving
- fit to  local context
- form at, evaluation
ethical
validity
Figure 10. The contexts o f discovery, justification and implementation, their links to the conceptual, technical and 
implementation design o f research, the methodological attention that they receive, and the criteria which are or 
should be used.
In the bulk of research methodology, i.e. the methodology for quantitative research, almost 
all the attention was and is still paid to exploring and developing methods and software 
for data analysis. Apart from this neglect of the conceptual design, here relatively little 
effort was spent on methods and procedures for observation and data gathering. In the 
methodology for qualitative research we see the reverse. Relatively speaking, a great deal 
of attention is paid to observation and data gathering and relatively little to analysis of 
the research material (see also van de Vail 1980: 14 1). The same goes for ignoring m eth­
ods for adequately reporting research results (van de Vail 1980: 14 1) and implementing 
this knowledge for problem solving or the construction of an artefact.
One of the consequences of this overdevelopment of the context of justification is 
tha t little has changed in the educational programmes in research methodology at uni­
versities over the last forty years. This education consists partly of courses in statistics. 
In almost all disciplines in the social, policy and management sciences statistics plays 
a considerable role in the education in the first two years of the Bachelors programmes. 
Hardly anything has changed in the basics of statistics. In contrast, when it comes to 
methods of (multivariate) data analysis, a great deal has changed. During the last four 
decades several methods and software were added or improved for complicated forms 
of multivariate analysis tha t can handle problems such as non linearity, low levels of 
measurement, longitudinal data, autocorrelation and multicollinearity. However, most 
of them are too sophisticated to be introduced in the first two years of the Bachelor’s
W H Y  A M E T H O D O L O G Y  F O R  P R A C T I C E - O R I E N T E D  R E S E A R C H  IS A N E C E S S A R Y  H E R E S Y
stage at universities. At the same time in most faculties in the Netherlands there is 
hardly any education in research methodology in the third year. The consequence of all 
this is that very little of what has been developed in research methodology during the 
past half century has become part of the curriculum. Research methodology that was 
presented to me when I was a student in sociology in the 1960s scarcely differs from 
what we offer students now.
The predominance of the context of justification at the expense of the contexts of 
discovery and implementation puts limits to the equipment of our present day students. 
This is all the more a problem because by far most of them will be involved in practice- 
oriented research once they leave university, rather than in theory-oriented research. 
And the biggest difference between these two types of research is just to be found in the 
context of discovery and, by definition, in the context of implementation. Students miss 
training in problem analysis, in selecting the right theories and concepts, in formulating 
methodologically adequate research questions, in the implementation of knowledge 
and related issues, such as manoeuvring in a political context, let alone in using the 
criterion of ethical validity (see section 7 ). Most of the effort, by far, is spent on methods 
of data gathering and data analysis.
Disregard fo r  the contexts o f  discovery and im plem entation  
The predominance of the context of justification not only led to deficiencies in what we 
teach our students. As we saw above, it also led to blank spots in developing research 
methodology. This can be further demonstrated on the basis of Figure 10 . Column V 
shows the general criteria to be met. From the predominance of the context of justifica­
tion we may conclude that there is a predominance of an epistemological validity and 
a neglect of ethical validity. The reason for this is that the latter mainly belongs to the 
contexts of implementation and especially of discovery. This does not imply tha t ethics 
has nothing to do with the way research is carried out, i.e. the context of justification, 
on the contrary. It means that it does not belong to the domain of ethical validity of 
knowledge as such, but to the area of the production  of knowledge.
A neglect of ethical and implementary validity is a consequence of positivism in 
science, with its doctrine of non-normative and its banishment of values from science. 
An indication for these blank spots is the bare fact tha t researchers and methodologists 
use the word validity as by far the most im portant scientific criterion. It automatically 
means epistem ological validity and takes as a touchstone correspondence with empirical 
reality. Not using an adjective for validity they express the implicit assumption that 
there is only one relevant touchstone for determining the quality of knowledge. They 
thus ignore implementary and ethical validity, based on two other im portant touch­
stones, i.e. the utility and moral correctness of knowledge, respectively. The focus on 
sensory observation and epistemological validity is understandable from the perspec­
tive of the tough and long-lasting process of detachment of science from religion and
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metaphysics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But, once empirical verifica­
tion has a firm basis in research and research methodology, there is no longer reason to 
ignore other criteria for validity besides epistemological validity. Below I will briefly reflect 
on the neglect of implementary validity, as well as deficiencies in its development. In 
the next section I will elaborate on the criterion of ethical validity.
As we already saw, almost thirty years ago van de Vail put on the agenda of researchers 
and research methodologists the implementary validity of knowledge. However, as far 
as I can see he, totally in line with the overemphasis on the context of justification of 
mainstream social sciences, only aimed at the context of justification part of it. This is 
also the part that I discussed in the sections 2 and 5. However, as column V of Figure 10 
shows, implementary validity is determined by decisions in all three contexts, i.e. the 
contexts of discovery, justification and implementation. That is, utility is not only a 
matter of justification. On the contrary, even more im portant is selecting the right 
object of research and asking the right questions about it. So, implementary validity 
deserves a firm place in the context of discovery, besides one in the context of justifica­
tion. And this is not all we can say. Apparently utility of knowledge is also a function of 
the way this knowledge is used and works out in the local context of the problem to be 
solved. So we still need to address an implementary validity in a literal sense. That is, 
although the traditional splitting up of the world of research methodology in a context 
of discovery and a context of justification holds for mainstream theory-oriented research, 
it does no t for practice-oriented research. This is a consequence of the fact th a t an 
implementary validity is not simply the result of researching the right thing (discovery), 
in the right way (justification). It also depends on an adequate im plem entation  and use 
of this knowledge.
Introducing a context of im plem entation  uncovers another directly related defi­
ciency of traditional research methodology. We still lack a thorough methodology for 
building an im plem entation design, besides a conceptual and a technical design (see Fig­
ure 10 ), that tells how the knowledge to be produced must be implemented, and/or 
how it can be used for tackling the problem at hand. There are several arguments to take 
the context of implementation to the domain of the researcher, instead of only to the 
one of the problem solver. The first is tha t most often the results of a practice-oriented 
research are not a set of ready-made rules and instructions how to solve the problem. 
Rather it is knowledge tha t sheds light on the problem to be solved and on the stages of 
the intervention and design cycle. So this knowledge needs to be translated into an inter­
vention or an artefact. For this translation it is often im portant to know what assump­
tions were made by the researcher, as well as the reach and limitations of this knowledge 
tha t he or she perceives.
A second reason is that during the process of carrying out the research the researcher 
gathers all kinds of tacit knowledge. This is knowledge where he or she is not looking 
for, but that nevertheless is gained as an unwanted, and often unconscious by product
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of the research project. This knowledge, however, in general is im portant for tackling a 
problem. A third and final reason is that, if everything works out well, a practice-oriented 
researcher is trained in intervention and design methodology. Amongst others this 
relates to the use of the intervention cycle and the design cycle, and insight in the way 
the knowledge produced fits to the several stages of these cycles.
To sum up, the blank spots in research methodology relate to the contexts of dis­
covery and implementation, and the related issues in the conceptual and implementa­
tion design of a practice-oriented research. Moreover, overstressing the context of jus­
tification went hand in hand with a neglect of ethical validity of knowledge, the latter 
primarily being a function of the contexts of discovery and implementation, rather 
than of the context of justification. More about this in the section to follow.
7 . D I S R E G A R D  E O R  E T H I C A L  V A L I D I T Y
The banishment of values from science by the positivists was not only detrimental to 
developing (a methodology for) implementary validity. It also led to neglect of ethical 
validity as an im portant criterion for scientific products. Certainly, there never was any 
ignorance about moral correctness as a criterion for the way the researcher carries ou t 
the research (justification). For instance, there are strict norms for doing experimental 
research. These norms say that experimental subjects should be treated well and honestly, 
that the experiment should not be to their disadvantage, and that if they run any risk the 
researcher should follow the principle of informed consent. If he or she does not follow 
these ethical rules, there will be debate in the media and rejection by colleagues.
It’s striking tha t here once more there is a one-sided attention for the context of 
justification (see, for instance, Swanborn 2009). As to the moral correctness of the 
results of scientific research there for a long time has been no debate in the social, 
policy and management sciences. In the middle of the last century there was such a 
debate, when nuclear physics was developed. The question was raised as to whether it 
was permitted for scientists to produce knowledge that could be used to construct an 
atomic bomb. The outcome of this discussion was the general standpoint tha t science 
can’t  be blamed for this and tha t it is the responsibility of those who use the knowledge 
for the production of such an evil device. This argument is based on the distinction 
between the producer and the user of scientific products. The responsibility was placed 
clearly on the shoulders of the second.
This separation of the roles of producer and user of scientific knowledge is reason­
able for theory-oriented research, as it deliberately has no external goal. But once there 
is such a goal, as is the case in practice-oriented research, this separation becomes less 
clear. Here in the end the researcher decides what can or should be done in addressing 
the problem at hand. W hat would then be the argument for saying tha t here the re­
searcher has no responsibility relating to the effects of her or his advice?
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This responsibility as to the value of the products of practice-oriented research has two 
aspects: in strum en ta l and m oral correctness. They correspond to implementary and 
ethical validity, respectively. The instrumental correctness involves the question as to 
whether the knowledge produced actually contributes to the solution of the problem at 
hand. There is some tendency in society and in legal practice as well to make this a 
point of duty for the researcher. However, relating to the moral correctness there is as 
yet not such a development. The criterion of ethical validity states that the knowledge 
produced should not contradict profound values, such as the values of freedom, security 
and absence of violence, sustainability of the environment, health and the like. Below 
I will elaborate on the role that ethical validity plays or m ust play in practice-oriented 
research.
As already stated, a neglect of ethical validity makes part of a more general devel­
opm ent in science, i.e. non-normativity and a neglect of values. Below I will briefly 
describe four well-known issues in social science where values play or should play an 
im portant role, and where neglect of this role may easily, and in practice does, cause 
problems with implementary and especially with ethical validity. These issues are: (a) 
Single-loop versus double-loop learning, (b) goal-based versus goal-free evaluation, (c) w ants  
and demands versus needs of a target population and (d) the F-side and D -side of practical 
problems. Every issue contains two variants or components, where the second variant 
or component requires confrontation with values, and where w ithout this confronta­
tion may easily raise problems with ethical validity. These issues show tha t there is a 
general reluctance in present day practice-oriented research to consider deeper values 
and ethical validity. Correspondingly there is more attention for the first variant/com ­
ponent. Before elaborating these issues the reader is warned that they only represent 
clear and straightforward examples; problems with ethical validity may play a role in 
many aspects and stages of scientific practice-oriented research.
( 1 ) Single-loop versus double-loop learning: These concepts have a direct link with the 
context of justification and the context of discovery, respectively. Single-loop learning 
is about the question: Are we doing things right? Double-loop learning aims at answering 
the question: Are we doing the right things? Part of the last issue is the question as to 
whether we are striving for the right goals. An adequate answer to this question is only 
possible with reference to profound values such as the value of well being, of equality or 
of freedom. A schematic picture can illustrate the difference between single and double­
loop learning (see Figure 11 below).
Three issues are closely related to the phenomena of single and double-loop learn­
ing: escalation of commitment, searchlight bias and opportunity costs. The three of 
them belong to the context of discovery, and they in principle are suspected for causing 
problems with ethical validity. Escalation of commitment is the tendency to stick tighter 
to a certain goal with an increase in the am ount of investment, even if the investments 
do not appear to be efficient for achieving this goal. The reason for this behaviour is
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Figure 11. Single and double-loop learning. X = goal, Y is action / intervention, Z = a value deeper than X
that the loss of giving up the goal becomes bigger as the am ount of investments in­
creases. It stands to reason that this behaviour easily may counteract ethical validity, as 
it prohibits debate on both the goals and the allocation of efforts. It requires double­
loop learning to uncover this mechanism.
Another im portant threat to striving for the right goals is what I call the search­
ligh t bias. It’s the bias of looking primarily at those things for which we have suited or 
cherished methods. This problem is not imaginary, given the overemphasis on the con­
text of justification in present day science. The essence of this problem may be illustrated 
by the metaphor of the drunk who lost his key at night. He was looking at it in the light 
of a lamppost, not because he lost it there, but because there was light. This mechanism 
too may be a thread to ethical validity, as it draws attention away from a critical evalua­
tion of the goals of goal-oriented hum an behaviour, such like strategic management 
and public policy.
There is a particular danger of searchlight bias in cases that research strategy appears 
to be successful for a certain type of goal. This may cause a tendency to use it blindly for 
all kinds of other goals, even if it proves to be less effective. Another reason for search­
light bias may be the existence of a paradigm. If researchers make part of a group or 
context where there is a certain strong belief, for instance in quantitative research 
strategies, it is very difficult to deviate from this norm. For more information on search­
light bias the interested reader is referred to Verschuren 2009. Again we need double­
loop learning for avoiding problems with or repairing ethical validity.
A concept tha t is closely linked to searchlight bias is the concept of o p p ortu n ity  
costs from economists. A well-known criterion for the adequacy of an investment is 
efficiency, which means tha t we maximally achieve our goals with a minimum of costs, 
including negative side-effects. However, striving for efficiency is an instance of single­
loop learning. Striving for minimizing opportunity costs means that we avoid invest­
ments in a goal, whilst striving for another goal would have given a higher gratification 
or a morally more acceptable or higher prioritized goal. This too requires double-loop 
learning and consideration of ethical validity.
(2 ) G oal-based versus goal-free evaluation: Closely related to the distinction between 
double and single-loop learning is the distinction between goal-based and goal-free
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evaluation. Mainstream evaluation is goal-based. That is, over ninety percent of all evalua­
tion research is of this type. It involves the judgment of an intervention (public policy 
programme, strategic management) or an artefact, with the goal of the intervention or 
artefact as a criterion. The intervention or artefact is said to be a success to the extent 
tha t (a) its goals are achieved and (b) this goal achievement is a consequence of this 
intervention or artefact. This is a matter of effectiveness and implementary validity. 
Goal-free evaluation, however, takes one or another value as a criterion for evaluation. 
This value may be, for instance, the well-being of the stakeholders, sustainability of the 
environment or socio-political stability in society. Here ethical validity is at stake. It 
stands to reason that a goal-based evaluation may turn out positive, whereas a goal-free 
evaluation of the same intervention or artefact is negative and vice verse, depending on 
the chosen value(s). This demonstrates the relevance of ethical validity besides imple­
mentary validity, as a criterion for the value of the results of scientific practice-oriented 
research (see also Verschuren and Zsolnai 2001).
The choice of a value as a criterion for goal-free evaluation is a matter of politics 
and ethics; it can’tbe  made on purely scientific (read epistemic) grounds. There are two 
relevant and well-established traditions in ethics, i.e. consequentialism  and deontology. 
Consequentialism bases the evaluation of an intervention or an artefact purely on its 
actual consequences. The conclusion of such an evaluation can be positive if the inter­
vention or artefact meets needs, wants or ideals of the stakeholders. Deontology takes 
as a criterion for evaluation the correspondence of the intervention or artefact with 
ethical norms. In the first case there in principle is an in stru m en ta l criterion, whereas 
in the second case a norm ative  standard is taken as a touchstone. The instrumental 
character of the first may be a problem. This means that in a consequential view an 
object can have a positive evaluation, and at the same time in a deontological assess­
m ent have a negative evaluation.
(3) W a n ts  and dem ands versus needs of the target population: In the domain of somatic 
and psychosocial healthcare there is a theory of demands of clients that makes a dis­
tinction between needs and wants (Bradshaw 1972, Rijckmans 2005). A need is what 
professionals think is good for the client, whereas wants relate to what the latter him ­
self thinks is good. And demands are tha t part of the wants where the client actually 
asks for. Wants and demands are based on subjective and mostly implicit perceptions, 
feelings, opinions and evaluations of the client. Needs are based either on professional, 
i.e. medical and psychosocial scientific, standards or on ethical norms such as health, 
well-being and fairness. The first case is an instance of consequentialism, whereas the 
second is in the domain of deontology.
This theory of health care can be used as a metaphor of the relationship between 
a practice-oriented researcher and a client or target population. If the client defines the 
research issue differently from what the researcher thinks is needed for the client, the 
latter has an ethical problem. Shall he or she follow the client, who in the short term
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will be satisfied with this consent, or does he or she persevere in what he or she thinks 
is needed? In the latter case the client will be dissatisfied at that very moment, but in 
the long run this evaluation may positively change, if the opinion of the researcher 
turns out to be right. In any case the researcher m ust follow the principle of informed 
consent. That is, he or she only accepts the standpoint of the client after he or she has 
explained what the needs are following professional or ethical standards. There is a 
strong tendency in practice-oriented research to follow the demands of the client without 
any debate. A researcher who sticks to professional or ethical needs can easily be regarded 
as intrusive. See for more information about this metaphor Verschuren 2008.
(4 ) The F-side versus the D -side  of a problem: As we saw in section 4 a practical problem 
can be defined as a contradiction between a factual (F-side) and a desired state of af­
fairs (D-side). This desire may either relate to something to be achieved or to be avoid­
ed or prevented. This has a link with the distinction between an improvement problem 
and a construction problem. To define something as an improvement problem means 
the prevention or avoidance of bad results, which is an instance of reactive behaviour. 
Defining a construction problem means an endeavour to achieve something valuable, 
which is proof of proactive behaviour.
A serious problem in practice-oriented research is that very often practical problems 
are only defined in terms of the F-side. For instance, a national government puts the 
problem of a high rate of immigration on the agenda. However, a high rate of immigra­
tion is just a fact. It says nothing about a problem. The question here is what in this 
respect the government considers to be a good or desirable state of affairs. No immigra­
tion at all? A lower rate of immigration? And, if so, how much lower? Should there be 
other rules for immigration? If so, which rules? A different distribution of immigrants 
over the country? Less concentration in certain local areas? Other -  or more stringent 
-  conditions for immigrants to meet? And which conditions? The reason why the D-side 
is so often not recognized is again the fact that this requires the choice of a value and 
thus taking the issue of ethical validity into consideration.
Ignorance of the D-side is a serious drawback for problem solving. The reason is 
that the way a problem is tackled very much depends on the way the D-side of a problem 
is defined. For tha t reason the lack of a definition of the latter sooner or later will hinder 
a satisfactory resolution of the problem at hand, which actually in practice is often the 
case. W ithout this definition it is not even clear what the problem is (see Verschuren 
2008). Here too the distinction between an instrum ental and a normative touchstone 
is at stake. That is, the D-side of a problem definition may refer to either instrumental 
or ethical reasoning. The first case is an instance of an in stru m en ta l problem, whereas 
in the second case I call it a norm ative  problem (see Verschuren 2008).
W ith the exception of the couple goal-based versus goal-free evaluation, the above 
issues are especially relevant for the first stage of the intervention cycle, the stage of 
problem analysis. They all relate to the context of discovery. More specifically they can
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be applied for answering the question what will be taken as the object of the research 
and which research questions will be formulated. The issue of goal-based versus goal- 
free evaluation of course can be used in the last stage of both the intervention and the 
design cycle. In all these cases the criterion of ethical validity plays or should play an 
im portant role.
A final distinction that can be made in this respect relates to the reach of the crite­
rion of ethical validity. In correspondence with a universal distinction as to (epistemo- 
logical) validity, we can divide ethical validity in an internal and external ethical validity. 
Internal ethical validity answers the question as to whether the knowledge comes up to 
the benefit of the stakeholders. This may also be called the needs of the stakeholders, as 
distinguished from their w ants and demands (see point 3 before). External ethical validity 
relates to the question as to whether the knowledge produced helps a general well-being  
and a susta inable arrangem ent o f  society  and its individual members. This may also be 
called the social relevance of the knowledge, as distinguished from a theoretical and a 
methodological relevance. The criterion of external ethical validity is not only relevant 
for practice-oriented research, but also for theory-oriented research. But the in ternal 
ethical validity is a criterion tha t is specific for practice-oriented research.
8 .  C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  F U R T H E R  D E V E L O P M E N T S
A last question tha t needs to be answered is what consequences all this has for research 
methodology in the domain of practice-oriented research. There are three possible 
types of consequences to be addressed: (a) Reallocation/adaptation of existing research 
strategies and methods, (b) Further development/extension of these strategies and 
methods, (c) Development of new procedures, methods and strategies (see the left 
column of Figure 13). The first two are improvement problems, whereas the latter is an 
instance of a construction problem. To explore these consequences four types of informa­
tion are needed. (1 ) The im portance  of existing research strategies for practice-oriented 
research, which comes down to the opportunity they offer for achieving firm imple- 
mentary validity. (2 ) The degree to which these strategies are actually  used in social, 
policy and management science research. (3) The degree to which these strategies are 
developed and articulated in research methodology. (4 ) Blank spots in existing research 
methodology, seen from the standpoint of practice-oriented research. The first and last 
type of information can be deduced from the sections 5 and 6, respectively. The first 
three points of information above relate to existing methodology, point 4 relates to 
developing new methodology.
As to the first three points, I will distinguish four main categories of research 
strategies: quantitative, qualitative, knowledge-based and reflective research. From the 
category of quantitative research I exclude the testing experiment. The reason is that it 
not necessarily is quantitative. Besides, it differs methodologically considerably from 
correlational research. Thus below quantitative research coincides with correlational
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D egree o f .. .
Type o f research strategy
quantitative qualitative knowl. bas. reflective
1. importance fo r im plem entary validity ++ + + -
2. actual use in m ainstream  research ++ + -
3. m ethodological development ++ + - + -
Figure 12. Degree o f (a) importance for im plem entary validity, (b) actual use and (c) methodological development 
o f a quantitative, qualitative, knowledge-based, and reflective research strategy. - = low degree,++ = very high 
degree
Change in relation to m ethodology Confrontation
a. reallocation/adaptation
b. further developm ent /  extensions
c. developm ent o f  new procedures
im portance — ►  actual use 
actual use — ►  developm ent 
blank spots — ►  needs
Figure 13. Confrontations for inferences about desired changes in research methodology
research. From the category of qualitative research I exclude the Q-type. The reason for 
this is that it was exclusively developed for theory-oriented research. Thus its relevance 
for practice-oriented research is low, or at least fuzzy.
On the basis of the analyses in section 5 the first three categories of information 
above were provided with scores (see Figure 12 ). Category (d) concerning blank spots 
will be elaborated later on. For more detailed scores relating to row 1 of Figure 12 , see 
Figure 5. As this row shows, the qualitative type of research offers the best perspective 
for implementary validity. Second best is knowledge-based research, third best reflective 
research, while the quantitative type of research seems to offer the least perspective in 
this respect. The low score for the actual use of qualitative research in row 2 may strike 
the reader as strange, but this is the result of eliminating the Q-type. Compared to the 
other variants of qualitative research, the Q-type is used quite often.
By means of three confrontations an answer can be given to the question what 
kind of consequences for research methodology can be derived from the analyses in the 
previous sections. These are indicated in the right column of Figure 13 . From the first 
confrontation we can conclude whether a strategy is over or under-exploited. Because 
the actual use to a large extent relates to mainstream (theory-oriented) research, this 
may provide an inference as to the demand for reallocation of research strategies seen 
from the standpoint of practice-oriented research. From the second confrontation of 
actual use with the degree of development may be derived whether research strategies 
deserve further methodological development.
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As to the first confrontation, we initially perceive th a t quantitative research is widely 
used in mainstream social, policy and management sciences, whereas its importance 
for achieving implementary validity is very low. Seen from the standpoint of practice- 
oriented research this indicates over-exploitation. The inverse is true for qualitative 
research strategies. Their importance is very high, but actual use is low; a case of under­
exploitation. The same goes for knowledge-based research; it combines a pretty high 
importance with a low frequency of use. Much is to be gained by reinforcing both the 
methodological soundness and its actual use in practice. Finally reflective research is 
slightly under-exploited. From Figure 12 it may be concluded tha t with respect to prac- 
tice-oriented research some reallocation of research strategies is needed. This comes 
down to the advice: less use of quantitative research, in favour of (in order of increasing 
importance) reflective, knowledge-based and qualitative research.
As to the second confrontation, what strikes one first is the similarity of the scores 
in row 2 and 3 of Figure 12 . This indicates that, as one would expect, the methodological 
development of research strategies is roughly in step with their actual use. This pattern 
is only slightly broken by reflective research. The reason for this may be tha t reflection 
is a universal part of science and scientific research that already has a very long tradition. 
This does not detract from the fact that existing forms of reflection can be improved 
and adapted to include a focus on implementary and ethical validity and tha t new 
forms could be developed by methodologists. Seen from the perspective of practice- 
oriented research, actual use should be upgraded to the level of the importance scores 
in the first row of Figure 12 . The scores in the third row suggest tha t more methodo­
logical investment is needed to further develop qualitative, knowledge-based and reflec­
tive research strategies, at the expense of investments in the methodology of quantitative 
research.
So far we have focused on the tendency to reallocate or further develop/extend 
existing research strategies and linked worthwhile investments by researchers and 
methodologists. A final question that needs to be answered on the basis of the analyses 
in the preceding sections is which gaps remain in research methodology and thus which 
new methodologies are needed. This question is closely linked to convictions in main­
stream social, policy and management sciences. That is, as is discussed in sections 6 
and 7, there has for decades been an overemphasis on just a few domains in research 
methodology. These domains represent fixed doctrines in the above-mentioned sciences. 
The left column in Figure 14 provides an overview of the most im portant doctrines, 
seen from the standpoint of practice-oriented research. In the middle column we see 
their counterparts: im portant issues for practice-oriented research. In mainstream 
theory-oriented research these are often regarded as heresies. These heresies precisely 
indicate which new developments in research methodology are needed, seen from the 
perspective of practice-oriented scientific research. So columns 1 and 2 in Figure 14 
elucidate the third confrontation in Figure 13: blank spots versus needs. At first sight,
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Figure 14. Doctrines o f mainstream (theory-oriented) research, versus demands o f practice-oriented research, and 
types o f consequences for research methodology
the number of heresies looks pretty high, but these all are closely related and should be 
seen as comprising a syndrome.
The right column of Figure 14 shows the consequences for methodology. Here the 
three categories mentioned at the beginning of this section are used: reallocation  of 
existing methods and strategies, extension  of these methods and strategies, and develop­
ment of new criteria, procedures, methods and strategies, indicated as new  development.
A first doctrine relates to the exclusive relevance of the context of justification. 
Roughly estimated over ninety percent of the publications in settled research method­
ology are in the domain of data gathering and especially data analysis, including such 
issues as sampling, external and internal (epistemological) validity and supporting 
software. In order to reinforce the power and effectiveness of practice-oriented re­
search, more investment of researchers and methodologists is needed in the contexts of 
discovery and implementation. Progress can be made through analytical philosophical 
reflection of issues such as: the relationship between truth, utility and moral correct­
ness, i.e. between epistemical, implementary and ethical validity, as well as between 
specialization, holism and interdisciplinarity, to mention just a few.
Many scientists are convinced or make the implicit assumption tha t developing 
methodology, i.e. procedures, methods and supporting software, is only possible in the 
context of justification, i.e. for data gathering including sampling, and data analysis. 
This is evidently not true. Perhaps the reason for this erroneous idea is that in the context 
of justification we can often make use of numerical scores and numbers for counting. 
However, there is no reason why we can’t  create methodological guidelines, procedures, 
methods and software for conceptual issues as these are often at hand in the contexts 
of discovery and implementation. The only difference will be tha t they have the form of 
heuristics, rather than of algorithm s as is the case with quantitative data analysis. There
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are two differences between these approaches. In the latter case, the assumption is that 
there is only one correct solution or outcome, whereas in the case of a heuristic there is 
no single right answer. Secondly, in an algorithm the steps are fixed in advance and 
m ust be followed in a prefixed order, whereas a heuristic is more like a searchlight, of­
fering the researcher much more degrees of freedom.
A second mainstream doctrine is the primacy of epistemological validity. Although 
its importance can by no means be denied, because of the centrality of its empirical 
basis, it draws attention away from implementary and ethical validity. For real progress 
in practice-oriented research, we need more investments in these domains by research 
methodologists and by philosophers of science specialized in ethics. These criteria must 
not only be further explored. Procedures, methods, strategies and software tha t meet 
these criteria m ust also be developed.
Another conviction in mainstream science is the primacy of quantitative research 
and related analytical reductionism in science. This type of research requires the research 
object to be unravelled into observation units and variables. Although this makes a 
thorough analysis and internal as well as external (epistemologically) valid conclusions 
possible, it raises the question as to whether we are losing sight of an overall view. To 
adequately intervene in reality we need this view of the object as a whole. This is one 
reason for an earlier conclusion that qualitative research which fits a holistic approach 
is often more valuable for practice-oriented research than quantitative strategies, other 
things being equal. However, much greater investment is needed in the methodology of 
qualitative research (see section 6).
Roughly the same goes for hyper-specialization in science. There’s no doubt that 
this specialization is a major reason for the strong progress of science in the last half 
century. However, practical problems tha t need to be addressed in practice-oriented 
research have many aspects, causes and consequences. A thorough -  and sustainable - 
solution often requires interdisciplinary research, especially when these causes interact 
with each other, as is often the case (see section 6 and Verschuren 2008 for details).
The primacy of external validity or generalizability is another sacred cow of m ain­
stream researchers. However, in many practice-oriented research projects the solution 
to the problem at hand primarily requires profound insight into local processes, peo­
ple’s habits, belief systems and motivations, as well as context-bound knowledge, much 
more than general, law-like, theoretical and abstract knowledge.
And, last but not least, since the nineteenth century for most scholars in the nat­
ural and social sciences empirical or data-based research as I call it is the only valid 
form of research. This is a direct consequence of the primacy of epistemological validity. 
W hen it comes to implementary and ethical validity, we also need hum an resource- 
based research. However, as yet little is known about the epistemological internal and 
external validity of the results of hum an resource based strategies. When it comes to 
the knowledge-based variant, we should also know more about how to select the exper­
W H Y  A M E T H O D O L O G Y  F O R  P R A C T I C E - O R I E N T E D  R E S E A R C H  IS A N E C E S S A R Y  H E R E S Y
tise, and how to train experts in such a way tha t the return on the research is greatest. 
One major difficulty at this point is judgement by the experts of research questions fol­
lowing criteria and definitions offered by the researcher. Experts are very much prone 
to use their own criteria and definitions, which leads either to biased or to irrelevant 
conclusions. Another challenge to methodologists in this domain is how best to rein­
force the interdisciplinary power of this type of research. How can we train the experts 
in such a way tha t expertise in different disciplines interacts optimally to create inter­
disciplinary insights, knowledge and know-how? One issue that can lead to bias here is 
the competition for dominance among the participating experts. And what are the effects 
from biases tha t may be based on differences in power of the participants, from rivalry, 
from misunderstandings caused by paradigmatic differences, and how can we avoid or 
reduce them?
W ith respect to reflective research, reflection has always played an im portant role 
in social, policy and management science research. However, given the central place of 
empirical research in these sciences, it is little used as a specific research strategy. Yet it 
deserves a strong position, especially in practice-oriented research designed to address 
construction problems, i.e. developing material or immaterial artefacts. But here too 
the task for research methodologists in the future is to develop a special methodology 
for addressing construction problems, i.e. supporting the design cycle.
Another limitation of the primacy of empirical or data-based research is the use 
of the empirical cycle. Seen from the standpoint of practice-oriented research this is 
second best. The intervention cycle and the design cycle are preferable when addressing 
practical problems. On this point too, research methodologists still need to do a great 
deal of work. There is a vast methodological literature on evaluation related to the in ­
tervention cycle. Besides, there are numerous books and articles about problem analy­
sis, which is mostly discussed in terms of problem structuring. However, there are gaps 
in research methodology as to the other stages in the intervention cycle.
As yet there is little in the literature that relates to the design cycle. In this respect 
there should be more interaction between the N-type and n-type of practice-oriented 
research methodology. In policy research (N-type) more use should be made of the 
design cycle and of an extended literature on problem structuring as it was and is still 
being developed in organizational research (n-type). Conversely, in organizational re­
search (n-type) more use should be made of an extended and well-articulated method­
ology for evaluation research, as has been developed in policy research (N-type). More­
over, in organizational research too little use is made of generic models for problem 
resolution, i.e. the intervention cycle and the design cycle.
Coming to the end of this essay, one last question needs to be addressed. In sec­
tion 2 , two (out of three) settled convictions that encourage a trail of methodology for 
practice-oriented research were formulated: (a) There is no methodologically relevant 
difference between theory and practice-oriented research, (b) Practice-oriented re-
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search is not the task of science and universities. Imagine tha t you, after reading the 
essay, became convinced that there are methodologically relevant differences. W hat 
then might be your argument to stick to conviction (b) ? The argument might be that in 
your view the primary task of science and universities is theory building, thus putting 
practice-oriented research under a ban. There are three counter-arguments against this 
position, tha t I will give the form of rhetorical questions. ( 1 ) If science and universities 
are not ready to develop this methodology, who else is going to do it? (2 ) How can uni­
versities say tha t it is not their task, as over ninety percent of their students come into 
contact with practice-oriented research once they leave university, rather than with 
theory-oriented research? (3) Why practice-oriented research would not contribute to 
theory building? The first two questions are straightforward, but the third needs some 
elaboration. This is all the more so, as here may lay the main argument against prac- 
tice-oriented research in the mainstream of the social sciences. To find an answer to 
this question we have to realize how processes of abstraction, generalization and theory 
building work.
In mainstream theory-oriented research in the social sciences there are two stages 
in this process. The first stage is at the micro-level of individual research projects. In 
this stage generalization occurs by means of the use of (a) abstraction in the concepts 
to be used and (b) random samples in combination with the use of inductive statistics. 
The results of such projects can to a large extent be external valid or generalizable. In order 
to develop abstract and general theories, we need a second stage at the macro-level of a
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scientific discipline, taking the products of the first stage as an im portant input, besides 
mental capacities of the scientist such like deductive and inductive reasoning, abduction 
and confrontation. In Figure 15 this two-stage process is visualized.
In contrast, in the case of practice-oriented research there is no first stage of abstrac­
tion and generalization. That is, in the practice-oriented paradigm there is at the level 
of individual research projects no endeavour to create abstraction or generalization. On 
the contrary, there is an endeavour to generate concrete, context-bound knowledge. 
But why should not we follow here the second stage, involving a process of abstraction 
and inductive reasoning? This even has important advantages compared to the two-stage 
process in the mainstream. Firstly theories may become richer and more profound. The 
reason is that in the first option details are lost already during the first stage. Moreover, 
in the first option the researcher is forced to use labour-extensive methods and strategies, 
in order to cover either a wide population or the abstract concepts that are being used, 
or both.
A second advantage is tha t in the case of a practice-oriented paradigm there are 
better opportunities to theorize on new phenomena, as well as on all kinds of processes 
(see section 2 ). Thirdly, other things being equal there is less chance for the bias of re- 
ductionism, as is argued too in section 2 under the heading of type of knowledge.
Last but not least, a big advantage of a practice-oriented paradigm is the social 
relevance of science, in reaction to a still growing pressure for more utility of its products, 
as is elaborated in section 1 .
Given the analyses and its conclusions, I would like to balance this essay with the 
statement that a new paradigm is needed in the social, policy and management sciences 
at universities, i.e. a paradigm of practice-oriented research. It’s a paradigm with a 
primacy of the contexts of discovery and implementation, besides the context of justi­
fication, primacy of implementary and ethical validity, and a primacy of holism and 
interdisciplinarity in contrast to reductionism. Each paradigm change in the history of 
science was accompanied by challenges to strongly-held convictions and doctrines, 
perceived as heresies by the scientific mainstream of the time. It won’t  be any different 
this time.
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